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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular 
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) 
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars 
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of 
violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of 
an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-
renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles, and books. 
Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive 
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the 
challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Dr. Martin Murphy is the author of this case study, which 
examines piracy in Somalia as well as international regimes that have 
been established to deal with piracy. The ultimate outcome is an 
analysis of what works and what does not work in countering piracy, 
the reasons for the results so far, and future options. Maritime piracy is 
not only a threat to shipping and global trade; it is linked to failed states 
and has tentative links to terrorism as well.  
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case 
study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the 
author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, 
the Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has 
been made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is 
ultimately responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the 
study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to 
provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics, including strategic, 
operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral questions 
confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make these 
case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the 
needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 






Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 
will probably find the extensive bibliography at the end of the case 
helpful. Compiled by the case study authors and by CIWAG 
researchers at the Naval War College, the bibliography is a selection of 
the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you 
find it useful, and look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases 
and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular 







Martin Murphy is a Senior Fellow at the Michael S. Ansari Africa 
Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States, in Washington, 
D.C. He was previously a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University’s 
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Nova Scotia and a Visiting Fellow 
at London Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s 
College, London. His books include Piracy, Terrorism and Irregular 
Warfare at Sea: Navies Confront the 21
st
 Century (Routledge, 2011); 
Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa 
(Columbia University Press, 2011); Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty 
Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World 
(Columbia University Press, 2009), which was named one of the 
outstanding academic titles of 2009 by the American Libraries 
Association; and Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
(Routledge, 2007). Dr. Murphy received his MA (with distinction) and 
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Afnet (African Fisheries Management) 
AIAI (Al-ltihaad Al-islaami) 
AMISOM (African Union mandated name) 
AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia)  
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AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)  
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ICU (Islamic Courts Union)  
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TNG (Transitional National Government)  
TTW (territorial waters) 
UAE (United Arab Emirates) 
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1. What are the key lessons of this case study for you? If you have 
operational experience in the regions under discussion, does this 
case study help to explain some of the dynamics that you 
witnessed? 
2. What are the main causes of piracy as identified by Murphy? 
3. What other variables might lead to piracy? 
4. Why is piracy so difficult to successfully supress? 
5. How can adaptation and reassessment tackle piracy? How would 
those tactics be seen by the local population of pirates – as a sign 
of strength, or weakness? 
6. How can conventional military forces be flexible enough to adapt 
to pirates’ changing tactics? 
7. Adaptation can lead to the opponent adapting, or evolving, 
perhaps to a stronger position. Can this be avoided? How can this 
evolution be recognized, and what should the effects of that 
discovery be? 






I. Conflict Context and Background 
 
A. The Chandlers: A Cautionary Tale 
On Friday, October 23, 2009, a 38-foot yacht, the Lynn Rival, 
was underway approximately 60 nautical miles (nm) off Port Victoria, 
Seychelles, heading towards Tanzania via the Amirante Islands.
1
 On 
board were Paul and Rachel Chandler, a British couple from the quiet 
town of Tunbridge Wells in Kent. He was 59, a retired quantity 
surveyor; she was 55 and had worked all her life as an economist. Paul 
Chandler was asleep below deck while his wife took the helm. At 0230 
two boats approached the yacht from the stern in the pitch darkness , 
the sound of their approach drowned by the noise of the Lynn Rival’s 
own engine. When two shots shattered the night’s tranquility, what the 
Chandlers’ lives had been up to that point no longer mattered. Their 
retirement dream was over. What they were now, and would remain for 
388 days, were hostages of Somali pirates. 
The Chandlers were experienced sailors. They had invested 
their retirement savings in a yacht that they were sailing around the 
world. They were cognizant of the pirate threat. They had taken advice, 
ensured their route took them no closer than 700nm from the Somali 
coast, and had delayed their departure until they believed the sea was 
too rough for the pirates to operate. All that had come to naught. Now 
they were sitting in the cabin of their own boat, surrounded by men 
with guns, ordered not to speak as they awaited the arrival of the pirate 
                                                          
1
 Except as noted, the information in this vignette is drawn from the following 
sources: ONI World-wide Threats to Shipping report, 4 November 2009 
http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_200911041
00000.txt; Aislinn Laing. “Somali pirates claim responsibility for kidnapping 
British sailing couple off Somalia,” Daily Telegraph, 27 October 2009; Lucy 
Cockcroft, “Somali pirates: Listen to Paul Chandler’s phone call,” Daily 
Telegraph, 29 October 2009; Will Longbottom and Michael Seamark,. “Brave 
British couple kidnapped by Somali pirates tell of terrifying moment when 
they were hijacked,” Daily Mail, 30 October 2009; David Jones, “They 
stormed the boat firing wildly. I cried out: “No guns! No guns!”‘ Daily Mail, 
27 November 2010; “Pirates demand $7 million for yacht couple, Britain 
says,” CNN.com, 31 October 2010; Chris Smyth, “Pirates demand $7 million 





leader, who had directed the hijack from a unspecified mother ship 
nearby. His name, it transpired, was Bugas. He was the 32-year old 
scion of an influential Somali family, and when he found out they were 
British he thought his ship had come in. As the days turned into weeks 
and still he could not turn the couple into cash, he made their life a 
living hell. 
The pirates ordered the Chandlers to sail the Lynn Rival 
towards Somalia while they ransacked it for money and valuables and 
casually vandalized its fixtures and fittings. Recognizing that the 
voyage would be slow, they radioed for support from other pirates 
based in Haradheere, who dispatched a Singapore-registered container 
ship, the Kota Wajah, that had been hijacked eight days earlier from 
approximately 190nm north of Port Victoria, Seychelles. It was 
anchored one mile off the coast near the town of Ceel Huur, about 70 
miles north of the more famous pirate village of Haradheere, in the 
remote Mudug region of central Somalia,and would became the 
Chandlers’ home for 36 hours before they were ferried ashore. 
On October 26, the Wave Knight, a Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
(RFA) large fleet tanker, had been ordered to depart the Gulf of Aden 
where it was operating in support of Coalition anti-piracy patrols and to 
make all speed for the waters between Somalia and the Seychelles. 
Tthe ship was manned largely by 75 civilians serving under naval 
discipline, as well as 25 Royal Navy sailors and a 20-man detachment 
of Royal Marines (RM) drawn from the Fleet Protection Group 
embarked specifically to undertake vessel boarding, contested if 
necessary. The 31,500-ton tanker sighted the 24,000-ton Kota Wajah 
on the evening of October 28 and tried to intimidate her into changing 
course by closing to within 300 feet, illuminating her with searchlights, 
and firing bursts from its two 30mm bridge-mounted cannons. The 
pirates’ response was to darken the container ship’s lights and return 
fire using their own small arms. Twice during the night the Marines 
were reportedly readied for action and the Merlin helicopter put on 
stand-by. Twice they were ordered to stand down, even when the Lynn 
Rival appeared. The Kota Wajah was slowed almost to a stop, a line 





the Wave Knight’s crew was able to observe the Chandlers being 
transferred from their small yacht to the container ship as their 
searchlights swept the scene. The Kota Wajah then turned languidly to 
the east and made course for Somalia. The Wave Knight apparently 
made no attempt to follow, waiting instead two hours for the frigate 
HMS Cumberland to arrive. A photo shows the two ships in sight of 
each other with the lonely Lynn Rival drifting between them. The Wave 
Knight lifted it on board and eventually returned it to the UK.  
One explanation for this reluctance to use force was that 
Cumberland had a Special Boat Service team on board that had been 
airlifted from the UK and dropped into the sea. For reasons unknown, 
the team’s departure from the UK was delayed by six hours and they 
arrived late in theatre. Because the Wave Knight alone was not able to 
prevent or delay the Kota Wajah from meeting up with the yacht or 
returning to Somalia, the SBS team was never used.
2
 
On October 28, Commander John Harbour RN, a spokesman 
for the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR), told 
reporters that they had a yacht in sight but could not confirm it was the 
Lynn Rival.  
The Royal Navy revealed on November 13 that the Wave 
Knight, had come “within 50 feet” of the yacht at one point. The Rules 
of Engagement under which it was operating prevented the crew of one 
hundred – mainly civilians, but armed with light weapons and equipped 
with a helicopter – from intervening because of the risk to the hostages’ 
lives. The statement issued by the Navy in October, however, only 
revealed the presence of the frigate HMS Cumberland. The RFA’s 
presence only came to light as the result of an anonymous tip-off by a 
member of its crew. The navy then said that the Wave Knight had tried 
                                                          
2
 Nick Constable, “Royal Marines could have rescued pirate hostages but the 
order to attack never came,” Daily Mail, 29 November 2009. N.B. UK 






“playing for time,” knowing that the Cumberland was making all speed 
for the area, but the pirates had eluded it.
3
  
The navy spokesman said that the Wave Knight had done “very 
well under the circumstances.”
4
 This was not an opinion that Paul 
Chandler shared in captivity three months later, saying that men on 
board the Wave Knight had taken the pirates’ threats “at face value. 
With hindsight, that might have been the opportunity to call their 
bluff."
5
 In May 2010 he admitted that the navy’s decision might have 
been the right one as he and his wife were still alive but added that “it 
really makes them – the whole fleet of warships – a laughing stock and 
that is what they are, a laughing stock for these people. They can’t do 
anything.”
6
 The sharpest public criticism came from the combative ex-
war correspondent and national newspaper editor Max Hastings who 
opined cuttingly that if the Royal Navy could not “act more effectively 
to defend British interests and citizens on the high seas, then it becomes 
hard to see what it exists for,” a comment that Britain’s head of navy, 
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, was forced to respond to directly.
7
 
It is important to acknowledge that there is a great difference 
between mounting a boarding, even one that is opposed, and rescuing 
hostages. Nonetheless, subsequent investigation threw doubt on much 
of the navy’s portrayal of events, fueled in large measure by the 
account given by the same angry and frustrated member of the Wave 
Knight’s crew who had alerted the press originally. Most specifically, 
although the ship was manned largely by 75 civilians serving under 
naval discipline, 25 Royal Navy sailors were on board as well as a 20-
                                                          
3
 John Bingham, “Royal Navy watched helpless as pirates kidnapped yacht 
couple Paul and Rachel Chandler,” Daily Telegraph, 13 November 2009. 
4
 Bingham, “Royal Navy watched helpless,”  
5
 Keme Nzeram, “‘Brutal treatment’ of pirate kidnap couple,” Channel 4 
News, 31 January 2010. 
6
 Jonathan Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to Cameron,” Channel 
4 News, 26 May 2010. 
7
 Max Hastings, “A cowardly navy, a cautious SAS and Britain’s humiliation 
by a pirate rabble,” Daily Mail, 25 November 2009; Michael Evans, “Navy 
could not rescue Paul and Rachel Chandler, says Admiral Stanhope,” The 





man detachment of Royal Marines (RM) drawn from the Fleet 
Protection Group embarked specifically to undertake vessel boarding, 
contested if necessary. Such detachments often deploy with a Marine 
Sniper Team, although it is not known if one was on board at the time. 
In additional to the Marines’ light infantry weapons up to and including 
general purpose machine guns, the ship was equipped with its own 
machine guns and two 30mm bridge-mounted cannons . However, the 
cannons were probably part of the RN’s Automated Small-Caliber Gun 
System designed to protect the RFA against fast-moving small craft 
equipped with rickets and crew-manned small arms. They would not 
have been suitable for use in the hostage situation that the ship found 
itself in.  
When the Kota Wajah made landfall, apparently at Haradheere, 
local elders reportedly refused to allow the pirates to put the Chandlers 
ashore, forcing the pirates to move them to a Spanish trawler 
(presumably the Alakrana, see below). They were subsequently 
transferred to a skiff and taken ashore elsewhere. A local fisherman 
said they were met by a group of 30 more pirates who had arrived in 
“luxury vehicles” and fired into the air to drive curious onlookers away. 
The Chandlers were taken to an isolated settlement located 100 miles 
inland, where the pirates supplied them with basic necessities such as 
bedding and water buckets, and began to feed them three rudimentary 
meals a day. On October 30, it was reported that the pirates had called 
the BBC to demand a $7 million ransom. The pirate spokesman (named 
Hassan in a Reuters report) said that the Chandlers had been “captured 
by our brothers, who patrol the coast”, implying that they had been in 
Somali waters illegally, despite the fact they were closer to the 
Seychelles than to Somalia when they were captured and outside even 
the 200nm territorial limit that had been asserted by the last functioning 
Somali government but never recognized under international law.
8
 He 
went on the justify the demand by saying that “Nato operations have 
had a lot of negative impact here — they have destroyed a lot of 
equipment belonging to the poor local fishermen. They arrest fishermen 
                                                          
8





and destroy their equipment, in defiance of our local administrations. 
They illegally transfer the fishermen to their own prisons, and prisons 
of other foreign countries, so when you consider the damage and all the 
people affected, we say the amount is not big.”
9
  
Straight away the British government said it would not 
negotiate with hostage-takers. At the same time another pirate 
spokesman, Mohamed Hussein, (or possibly the same one using a 
different name) threatened that if any attempt was made to rescue to 
Chandlers the pirates would “burn their two people’s bones,” while a 
third told a Spanish news agency that the group who had captured the 
Chandlers was the same group who were holding the Spanish fishing 
trawler the Alakrana, and any attempt to free one group of hostages 
would result in retribution on the other.
10
 
By November 20, the pirates were beginning to apply 
additional pressure. Britain’s Channel 4 News broadcast a two-minute 
video during which the Chandlers pleaded for their lives, saying the 
pirates were “losing patience” because “there had been no response to 
their demands for money.” They added that they had been told that they 
would “not be fed or given water” and moreover that there was “a 
terrorist gang at large in the country looking for us.”
11
 
At the beginning of December, the Guardian newspaper 
reported that a deal had been struck to pay the pirates a mere £100,000 
($159,700) but had been blocked by the British government.
12
 The 
source of the report was Nick Davis, the chairman of an private anti-
                                                          
9
 Smyth, “Pirates demand $7 million”; Duncan Gardham and Mike Pflanz, 
“Somali pirates threaten to kill British couple,” Daily Telegraph, 28 October 
2009. 
10
 Gardham and Pflanz, “Somali pirates threaten to kill British couple.” Two 
pirates from the Alakrana were sentenced by a Spanish court to serve 439 
years each, which will undoubtedly encourage many more Somali pirates to 
surrender. See Al Goodman, “Somali pirates get 439-year sentences,” 
CNN.com, 3 May 2011. 
11
 “British kidnap couple make video plea,” Channel 4 News, 20 November 
2009; Damien Pearse, “Kidnapped British sailors fear they may be killed 
within a week,” The Guardian, 20 November 2009. 
12
 Mark Townsend and Rajeev Syal, ““Ransom deal blocked for Somali 





piracy organization, the Merchant Marine Warfare Centre, who had set 
up an appeal and a website called “Save the Chandlers’ to campaign for 
their release. Davis posted a message on the website in January 2010 
repeating the claim that the British government had blocked the deal 
while at the same time admitting that only $100 had been raised to date 
and pleading for more.
13
 In a statement released shortly afterwards the 
then-Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said that although the British 




In January 2010 the pirates’ impatience was becoming 
palpable. They must by now have realized they were unlikely to 
achieve anything like the payoff they wanted, while the cost of feeding 
the couple and securing them from abduction by other groups was 
increasing. Once again they forced the couple to make a video in an 
attempt to increase the pressure. In it and in an interview following 
their release the Chandlers revealed they had been taken off the Kota 
Wajah and onDecember 14 separated and moved between different 
locations.
15
 They said the reason was that the pirates saw aircraft 
circling overhead. However, in the interview they gave following their 
release they revealed that the real reason was that Bugus, the brutal 
leader of the gang that was holding them, recognized that their spirits 
would be weakened once they were apart and in that state would be 
more willing to beg convincingly for money. It was during this period 
they were both told they would be handed over to the militant Islamist 
group al-Shabaab and Rachel Chandler was told separately that if that 
happened she would be beheaded.
16
  
                                                          
13
 “Solution for the release of British sailing couple,” Save the Chandlers, 22 
January 2010 at http://www.savethechandlers.com/tag/nick-davis/ 
14
 Damien Pearse, “Kidnapped British couple plead for help,” Sky News, 1 
February 2010. 
15
 Although this report says the locations were “around Haradheere,” they 
more likely to be around Adado, the settlement further inland that appears to 
have been the main place where they were held. 
16
 David Jones, “Whipped, threatened with beheading and on the brink of 
suicide,” Daily Mail, 29 November 2010. For further reading on the terrorist 





They were reunited for Christmas
17
 but nine days later were 
being threatened with separation again. Their immediate response was 
to go on a hunger strike in an attempt to force the pirates into agreeing 
to keep them together. On January 5, Bugus, driven into a rage by their 
defiance, first carried out a mock execution, then whipped them with a 
stick before beating Rachel Chandler with a rifle butt and knocking out 
two of her teeth.
18




In April an Islamist force advanced on Haradheere. This was 
suggested initially to be al-Shabaab but later was determined to be 
Hizbul Islam.
20
 The pirates were reported to have evacuated the town 
and moved themselves and their hostages north by either ship or 4x4.
21
 
Although the Chandlers were not forced to join the exodus, they were 
                                                                                                                               
the Sand : Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010) and “Counterterrorism 
Calendar 2011: Al-Shabaab,” The National Counterterrorism Center 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (accessed July 15, 2011). 
17
 They celebrated by eating a bag of walnuts that the captain of the Kota 
Wajah had given them before they left his ship and which they had kept 
hidden for just such an occasion. 
18
 In an interview given to the news channel ITN in May, Paul Chandler 
admitted this was the only real aggression they had faced. In the same 
interview he also indicated that by May they had been held separately for 97 
out of 200 days and the reason why they found it especially hard to bear was 
because they had no children and they had rarely been apart during 30 years of 
marriage. Even when they were reunited, they lived in constant fear that they 
would again be parted. Jonathan Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to 
Cameron,” Channel 4 News, 26 May 2010. 
19
 David Jones, “Whipped, threatened with beheading and on the brink of 
suicide”; Julie Etchingham, “Paul and Rachel Chandler: ‘We’re so lucky to be 
home,’” Sunday Telegraph, 28 November 2010; Nzeram, “‘Brutal treatment’ 
of pirate kidnap couple.”  
20
 For further reading on Hizbul Islam, see “Jane’s World Insurgency and 
Terrorism: Hizbul Islam,” Jane’s http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-
World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Hizbul-Islam-Somalia.html (accessed July 
15, 2011) and Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek, Islam and Muslim 
Politics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
21
 Martin N. Murphy. Somalia:Tthe New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the 






moved deeper into the bush as their captors reacted nervously to the 
changes, more so perhaps because Hizbul Islam said it would look for 
the captives and release them unconditionally if they were found.
22
 
Taking advantage of the confusion, a British journalist was able in May 
to travel to Adado (Adaado) where he found the Chandlers were still 
being held separately but that the pirates were growing increasingly 
skeptical they would make any money out of them. They blamed the 
couple’s lack of wealth and contrasted it with their claimed expenditure 
of $77,000 per month, mainly on khat, a mildly narcotic leaf chewed 
widely throughout Somalia.
23
 Towards the end of May the Chandlers 
were reunited to take advantage of the change of government in the UK 
following the 6
th
 May election. In an interview with the same freelance 
journalist, this time for ITN, they congratulated the incoming prime 
minister, David Cameron, but added that if “the government is not 
prepared to help, then they must say so, because the gangsters’ 
expectations and hopes have been raised at the thought of a new 
government and there might be a new approach.”
24
 
In fact the Chandlers’ family had raised £270,000 ($402,000). 
In June they made the mistake of paying this to the pirates without 
securing adequate assurances that they would be released. The money 
was dropped from a light aircraft into the bush a short way outside 
Adado. Once they had their hands on the money, the pirates reneged.
25
 
The speculation was that the negotiators working on the family’s behalf 
                                                          
22
 Matthew Weaver, “Somali pirates flee with British hostages,” The 
Guardian, 27 April 2010. 
23
 Jamal Osman, “Somali Islamists vow to free British hostages from pirates,” 
The Times, 9 May 2010. For more information on khat and its use by armed 
groups, see Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters: 
Complications, Dangers, and Responses (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2008) 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub850.pdf, accessed 
July 15, 2011. 
24
 Rugman, “Somalia kidnap: Chandlers’ plea to Cameron.”  
25









Nothing more was heard from or about the kidnapped couple 
for over four months. Then, on November 14, it was announced that a 
further ransom had been paid and that the Chandlers had been freed 
into the care of Adado’s governor, Mohamed Aden Tiiceey.
27
 The 
reason for the long period of silence was attributed largely to 
disagreements among the pirates, with a series of deals being accepted 
and then rejected.
28
 The real reason, however, was that the Chandler’s 
family had won a High Court injunction on July 30 prohibiting any 
mention of the couple or even the injunction’s existence (a so-called 
“super-injunction’). It was granted because a British newspaper was on 
the verge of publishing a story about a failed rescue bid in June that 
might have affected their safely and was renewed regularly until the 
couple was freed. This prevented the pirates from manipulating the 
British government and upping the ransom demand by planting stories 
about the Chandler’s health and mental state in the media.
29
 
Although the final sum paid has never been revealed, the 
assumption is that it totaled around £500,000 ($810,000), with the 
original sum dropped to the pirates in May being topped-up with a 
further payment in November, believed to be £280,000 ($453,600).
30
 
Speculation about the provenance of the money started immediately. 
On their way out of the country the Chandlers were diverted to 
Mogadishu, where they were greeted by high officials of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), although not by the president 
                                                          
26
 Caroline Gammall and Mike Pflanz, “Paul and Rachel Chandler: A year of 
disappointment ended with promise of freedom,” Daily Telegraph, 15 
November 2010. 
27
 Mike Pflanz, “Paul and Rachel Chandler released by Somali pirates after 
388 days,” Daily Telegraph, 14 November 2010. 
28
 Gammall and Pflanz, “Paul and Rachel Chandler”; Barbara Jones, “Yacht 
couple Paul and Rachel Chandler,” 
29
 “Why we kept silent on the Chandler’s case,” BBC News “The Editors,” 14 
November 2010; Adam Sherwin, “BBC defends news blackout over Chandlers 
Somali kidnap release,” Beehivecity, 15 November 2010. 
30
 Mike Pflanz, “Paul and Rachel Chandler: Pirates freed hostages in exchange 





Sharidf Ahmed. When the TFG claimed it had contributed the final 
tranche of £100,000 ($162,000) that had convinced the pirates to let the 
Chandlers go, many assumed that the money had been diverted from 
the contributions that the British government made to keep the regime 
in power. Both the British government and the TFG denied vigorously 
that any such linkage had occurred. The British pointed out that they 




Whatever the British government’s role in the payment may 
have been, most of the money appears to have been raised by the 
Chandler’s family, by well-wishers and, most interestingly, by 
members of the Somali diaspora community in the UK.
32
 The actual 
amount raised by the community may not have been great but its 
members did place the gang under enormous pressure to release the 
British couple. In February 2010 about 1,000 Somali residents in 
Britain gathered in central London to launch a fundraising campaign 
called Somali UK Solidarity. The leader of a band called Qaylodhaan 
composed a song calling for the Chandlers’ release and to help raise 
money. Dahir Abdullahi Kadiye, a Somali who had made his home in 
London and who the press loved to describe as a taxi driver, but was in 
fact the owner of a taxi company, played a leading role in channeling 
the community’s energy and interest in the case. He organized meetings 
at which Somalis in London were encouraged to contact their relations 
and friends still in Somalia to express their anger about the pirates’ 
actions. This pressure took its toll on the pirates’ morale, and 
eventually Kadiye was able to travel to Adado and assist with the 
hostage negotiation, even acting in a supervisor role in the final hand-
over. His motivation, he told reporters, was “to end the humiliation of 
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Somalis in the UK, because the British government has been good to us 
and given us refuge.”  
Another leading figure was Ridwaan Haji Abdiwali, a presenter 
on the London-based satellite channel Universal TV, who dedicated his 
Have Your Say program to the issue. This gave members of the Somali 
community a very public platform to vent their anger over what was 
happening. He interviewed Ali Gedow, a spokesman for the group 
holding the Chandlers, calling him every week until Gedow demanded 
that the pressure cease: “You are annoying us,” he said. “All we want is 
the money. . In Somalia, Adbi Mohamed Elmi, a doctor based at 
Magadishu’s Medina Hospital, also played a crucial role in the 
Chandler’s survival, journeying regularly to Adado to monitor their 
health. Although his status as a doctor gave him considerable standing 
in the community, he too credits the Chandler’s release to the actions of 
the Somali diaspora: “We mobilized all the elders and finally reached 
our target,” he said.
33
 
The ransom apparently was divided among about 40 people. 
The largest share, between 30 and 50 percent, probably went to the 
financiers, some of whom may have been based outside Somalia. The 
men who attacked the yacht would have taken a larger share than those 
who guarded the Chandlers during their captivity. The shopkeepers and 
others who supplied food and water for the pirates when they were at 
sea, food and necessities for the Chandlers when they were held on 
land, bribes to local officials and pay-offs to the local community 
would have taken the rest.
34
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The final irony was that the pirates claimed that capturing the 
Chandlers was an error. Ali Gedow, the spokesman who had been so 
unsettled by the TV presenter Ridwaan Abdiwali, told the BBC that it 
was “a mistake because they were not looking for the Chandlers, they 




In an interview given a year after her release, Rachel Chandler 
gave her considered judgment on Somalia and her captors. “We are 
not,” she said, “helping the situation by ignoring it. A whole generation 
of young men is growing up in Somalia believing that piracy is easy 
money. They have nothing to take them away from criminal activities. 
But in many ways they are akin to young men who get led astray, in 
our own inner cities, in gang crime of one sort or another.”
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1. Strategic airlift, particularly airlift with the range and 
navigational capability to deliver an air-dropped team to a 
ship at sea, are not common assets. What should be the 
appropriate role for high-demand, low-density assets in a 
large territory when only two hostages are involved? 
2. What is a reasonable length of time for a hostage rescue 
to be developed and carried out? If a rescue cannot be 
effected in a matter of days, does that indicate a failure on 
the part of naval powers? What other factors might 
complicate matters? 
3. Which of these two possible alternatives is more 
palatable: civilians being held hostage for a year, or 
civilian casulties resulting from a rescue attempt? What 
are other alternative courses of action, and what might 
their outcomes be?  
4. What would have been the consequences, political and 
otherwise, if the Wave Knight had mounted a rescue that 
failed or otherwise went badly?  
5. Was Hastings’s question too harsh, or was it justified? If a 
navy cannot defend the interests of citizens on the high 












II. Somali Piracy in Historical and Strategic 
Context 
 
This section focuses on piracy in general and situates Somali 
piracy in the context of the global arena. It discusses issues specific to 
Somali piracy and explores specific incidents and the various responses 
by the multiple groups affected by piracy. 
 
Discussion Questions 
1.  How is Somali piracy different from piracy practiced 
elsewhere? 
2. What features of Somali piracy could be copied or replicated 
elsewhere, e.g., Southeast Asia, the Gulf of Guinea? What 
militates against mimicry? 
3. What is meant when a state is described as “failed”? What are 
the implications for security? 
4. The economic impact of Somali piracy in the context of world 
(or even regional) trade has been miniscule. Why should it 
concern the United States or other maritime powers? If Somali 
pirates increase the levels of violence towards hostages, would 
this force greater military response? 
5. Piracy has rarely been suppressed at sea. Navies have generally 
had to operate against pirate bases from the sea. What are the 
legal and political impediments to pursuing such a course of 
action against the Somali pirates? What would need to change 
to justify even limited land operations against pirate bases? 
Would air operations – manned or unmanned—be justified 
instead, and could they be an adequate substitute? 
6. What would be the effect of making ransom payments illegal? 














In 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) came 
up with a tripartite classification of piracy, based on piracy in Southeast 
Asia and the South China Sea: 
 “low-level armed robbery,” opportunistic attacks mounted in 
harbors or other places close to land, 
 “medium-level armed assault and robbery,” or more 
challenging assaults carried out further from shore, which 
represented a greater challenge to ship safety and placed the crew 
at risk, and  
 “major criminal hijack,” that is, well-resourced and practiced 
operations that used violence to secure not only the cargo on board 
but often the ship itself. 
This classification system was well-suited to piracy in that 
specific region, but seems dated now. Seeing piracy largely as maritime 
armed robbery, it left no room for kidnapping, an activity common to 
piracy throughout history. It was also historically inaccurate in other 
respects. Violence has always been the essence of piracy, with robbery 
as a secondary characteristic. Any attempt to place what has occurred 
off Somalia into context would need to acknowledge the existence of 
six categories: (1) inland water assault; (2) assaults on local shipping 
and fishing vessels close to shore; (3) assaults on commercial shipping 
in coastal waters and straits, in both territorial waters and international 
waters; (4) major assaults to take ships and/or cargo, almost always in 
international waters; (5) major assaults to extract value from crew or 
passengers, almost always in international waters; and (6) coastal 














Figure 1: Pirate assault categories 
Type 
No. 
Category Description Example 
1 Inland water 
assault (TTW) 
Attacks mounted by 
small bands who 
may, or may not, use 
or threaten violence 
on ships in harbors 
or anchorages 
Commonplace in 
harbors around the 














might occur in 
IW) 
This form of piracy 
can often be 
extremely violent 
and may be 
occasioned by 
conflicts over fishing 
rights; it also can be 
persistent to the 
point that the victims 
regard it as a cost of 
business 
Attacks on fishing 
vessels off the Ganges 
Delta 
Attacks by Indonesian 
raiders on Malaysian 
fishing fleets in the 
Malacca Strait 
Attacks on fishing 
craft around the Sulu 
Sea (Philippines) 
Attacks on fishing 
craft and local traders 
around the Niger Delta 
(Nigeria) 






both TTW and 
IW) 
 
Attacks mounted by 
coastal raiders who 
can use or, more 
likely, threaten 
violence; 
perpetrators can both 
arrive and depart 
unseen with the 
intention of stealing 
Common form of 
piracy in Straits of 
Malacca and 
Singapore, and the 
South China Sea 
starting in the 1980s. 
In the northern part of 
the South China Sea, 





cash from the ship’s 
safe and from the 
crews’ quarters; it 
can also involve 
kidnap and ransom 
(K&R) 
sometimes extreme, 
e.g., the Cheung Son 
(1998). 
K&R incidents 
occurred in the Straits 
in the 2000s, most 
significant of which 
was the Idaten (2005) 
4 Major assaults 
to take ship 
and/or cargo 
(almost 
always in IW) 
Attacks mounted by 
highly professional 
gangs in which the 
cargo can be taken 
and the ship either 
abandoned or re-




A feature of Southeast 
Asian piracy for a 
decade starting in 
early 1990s. Many of 
the ships and cargoes 
were diverted to 
China; the ships used 
for fraud were re-
registered and used to 
steal other cargoes; the 
cycle could be 
repeated as many as 
nine times. 
Also observed off 
Lebanon during the 
1980s civil war  






always in IW) 
 
Attacks mounted by 
highly professional 
gangs as above who 
in this variant have 
no interest in the 
ship but focus on the 
crew’s portable 
wealth or ransom 
value 
Currently unique to 
Somalia 
The attacks on the 
Vietnamese ”boat 
people” arguably fell 
into this category; 
although not taken for 
ransom, they were 
stripped of their 
valuables and many of 






Historically, both men 
and women would 






the sea for goods and 
slaves. Currently 
rare but historically 
common 
In the modern era, 
coastal attacks have 
taken place in the 
Philippines, Borneo, 
and Nigeria 
TTW: Territorial waters  IW: International waters (the high 
seas) 
 
Two related forms of marine assault need to be mentioned, 
although neither are technically piracy. The first is politically motivated 
assault carried out by non-state actors. Examples include the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who were believed to have carried out Type 4 
assaults during the 1990s, and the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta, who carried out attacks against fixed offshore 
installations in the 2000s, most famously on the Bonga floating 
production and storage platform in 2008.
37
 These fail to satisfy the 
international definition because piracy is restricted to attacks mounted 
for “private,’ that is to say not political, ends.  
The second are attacks carried out by government vessels, such 
as those mounted by Chinese government vessels in the South China 
Sea in the 1990s. They prompted public allegations by Indonesia and 
an official complaint by Hong Kong, which was then still under British 
control. There is now more reason to believe that at the time that these 
interceptions took place, the vessels involved were operated by corrupt 
local police and customs units and were not operating under the orders 
of the central government. Indeed, Beijing launched a major campaign 
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against official corruption in the southern coastal provinces starting in 
1998. Similar incidents perpetrated by Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Navy (IRGCN) vessels occurred in the Northern Arabian Gulf between 
2003 and 2007. These vessels might have been operated by 
“freelancing” commanders, or they might have been an adjunct to the 
campaign of low-level harassment that the Iranian regime has carried 
out against Gulf shipping for over a decade. All these attacks fail the 
modern legal test for piracy, which excludes actions undertaken by 
government vessels. 
 
A. Piracy and Its Suppression 
Piracy has shared characteristics wherever it occurs, but in each 
case these are ordered according to local circumstances and arise out of 
local conditions. Provided outbreaks remain local, they can be 
confronted locally or, in many cases, ignored. But piracy has another 
characteristic, its mobility, which can make it a threat to international 
shipping. When pirates operate outside a state’s territorial waters, they 
can present a challenge to international good order at sea. Pirates have 
been vilified as the enemies of all mankind since Cicero, but although 
this resounding condemnation is rhetorically evocative, it has never had 
any meaning unless and until powers with the necessary resources have 
chosen to accept the challenge and defeat them. The general 
assumption has been that the powers that have done so have been 
predominantly naval, but although the capability to capture and kill 
marauders at sea has been important, more critical has been the ability 
to engage pirates on land violently or to transform pirate strongholds 
into responsible communities. Powers capable of effecting that 
transformation have always been relatively few in number.  
Moreover, counter-piracy has rarely been undertaken solely 
because pirates are bad people, and never in the absence of a clear 
economic rationale. As powers have matured, that rationale has tended 
to become less specific and more systemized, to the point where the 
political appears to subsume the economic. Examples of this 
systemization can be drawn from three security regimes: the Roman, 





suppressed pirates because they competed with it for plunder, and later 
to maintain order within its empire. Britain at first exploited then 
suppressed piracy in line with its mercantilist trade policy, and later 
suppressed it systematically to minimize disruptions to a maritime free-
trading system, of which its empire was the largest and most 
geographically dispersed component.  
In the 21st century, this begs the question: what is the U.S. 
interest in suppressing piracy? America is also the hegemon of a global 
system, but is not an imperial power in any traditional sense. It presides 
over an international system based on not only free trade but also 
national self-determination. One consequence of this detachment is that 
the economic rationale to intervene against piracy is no longer readily 
identifiable; the previously clear link between national trade and 
national interest has dissolved, replaced by the disembodied concept of 
the global trading system. Sixty years of peace, ever-expanding 
volumes of goods on the move, and the emergence of new and 
substantial stakeholders such as China, Japan, Korea, and India have 
spawned the notion that this trading system and its agent, the world’s 
maritime system, are robust and self-sustaining. Such a judgment 
smacks of complacency. It is one with the notion that order is based on 
law and agreement alone and that force is no longer necessary; indeed, 
it is an anachronism. In straitened economic times, it also plays into the 
hands of those who argue that navies should focus on combating 
“existential” threats.  
But America is the ultimate guarantor of maritime freedom, 
just as Rome and Britain were in the past. The role is loosely analogous 
to the dollar’s position as the world’s reserve currency; it gives the 
United States a huge advantage, one that the nation should fight to 
retain and allow to be eroded only with the greatest reluctance. Any 
navy that fails to protect trade has forgotten its roots. The U.S. Navy’s 
failure, in tandem with its coalition partners, to curb the activities of the 
Somali pirates raises doubts about America’s willingness to devote the 
necessary political resources to make maritime security a reality, 





leader of a global or regional maritime security regime.
38
 Yet the 
rationale for U.S. action is compelling because, as Jakob Grygriel has 
pointed out, failed states “are not only a source of domestic calamities; 
they are also potentially a source of great power competition” and 
because “America’s global rivals are doing what aspirant powers have 
done at moments of transition for millennia … probing the top state on 
the outer limits of its power commitments … reading America’s 
responses to gauge how much latitude they have to make low-cost 
revisions to the system in their favor.”
39
 Somalia, and the presence of 
rival navies off its coast justified rhetorically by a common need to 
suppress piracy, fits these descriptions well. 
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B. Piracy and the Gulf of Aden 
 
 
Map 2: Gulf of Aden 
 
Somali piracy cannot be seen in isolation from the wider 
geostrategic importance of free movement and safe passage to trade 
between Europe and Asia and energy movements outbound from the 
Arabian Gulf to much of the world. This importance has been brought 
into sharper focus by the growing political turmoil in Yemen, which 
has drawn attention on the fact that both sides of the Gulf of Aden 
constitute a single geo-strategic entity. The eighteen-mile-wide Bab el-
Mendeb is one of the world’s vital chokepoints. It is the gateway to the 
Suez Canal, and its closure would block off the sea route upon which 
this huge trade depends. Any realistic threat of complete closure would 
provoke a major political and military response. However, the same 
effect could be achieved using low-level attacks to persuade the 





maritime traffic would have to divert around Africa, adding ten to 
twelve days to a voyage. That threat would be one step nearer to 
realization if one shore of the Gulf were to fall into hostile hands, and it 
would increase substantially if both coasts were to fall under the sway 
of organizations with a common purpose. Britain occupied Aden in the 
19th century to guard the vital sea route to India and took control of 
what is now Somaliland when France, its leading imperial rival, 
threatened to expand its influence beyond the borders of the French 
Coast of the Somalis, today’s Djibouti. It is worth at least noting that al 
Qaeda’s two forays into maritime terrorism were both launched from 
Yemen: the attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor in 2000 and the 
attack on the MV Limburg off the oil port of Ash Shihr al Mukallah in 
2002. 
Yemen’s situation is not as desperate as Somalia’s. It is not a 
failed state but is nonetheless politically fragile and economically 
weak. The government is confronted by a rebellion by the Shi’ite 
Houthi faction in the north adjoining the Saudi Arabian border, a 
separatist movement in the south, and an al Qaeda faction, al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears ready to exploit 
whatever breakdown occurs. The militant group Al-Shabaab has sworn 
to support AQAP and to exploit the opportunity for the conflicts on 
either side of the Gulf of Aden to become “increasingly intertwined,” 
according to their Somali spokesman Mukhtar Robow. Although the 
use of a reductionist lens to conflate two separate conflicts needs to be 
resisted, contact has occurred between AQAP and al-Shabaab and 
coordinated action cannot be ruled out in the future. If al-Shabaab 
controlled the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden, the interchange 
between the two groups would become easier.  
A zone of instability stretching from Yemen to the Kenyan 
border effectively exists now. The prospect that some or all of this area 
could be turned into one where extremist Islamist groups predominated, 
even if whatever control they exercised was less than complete, would 
pose a significant threat to Kenya in the south, as far north as Egypt, 
and ultimately to Israel. Maritime security in the Gulf of Aden would 





1,000nm (1852 km) out in the Indian Ocean could be affected. The 
increasing availability and rapidly decreasing cost of lightweight 
guided weapons, small enough to be mounted on and fired from small 
craft, or with the range to be fired from the coast and targeted using 
small fishing craft or lightweight drones, could add to this threat 
substantially. The success pirates have achieved argues in favor of 
buttressing Somaliland and Puntland to head off that possibility by 
securing the Gulf’s southern shore. 
 
 
C. Somali Piracy Since 1996 
Pirate Groups Before 2006 
For most of the period between 1996 and 2006, piracy off 
Somali was a low-level activity. The groups that operated during this 
period were the Puntland group and others from Kismayo, Marka, and 
Haradheere-Hoboyo. 
 
 Puntland: This group consisted of a number of small bands 
based at Puntland’s Gulf of Aden coast around Boossaso and 
Caluula. These groups, which engaged primarily in smuggling 
people, arms, and drugs between their base areas and Yemen, 
appeared to engage in piracy opportunistically. It was reported that 
the pirates drawn from these bands provided the “Somali Marines” 
(see below) with their initial training.
40
 
 Kismayo: This was based in the southern port of Kismayo and 
known as the “National Volunteer Coast Guard.” It attacked 
fishing vessels and might have been a fishermens’ self-protection 
force as it claimed.
41
 
 Marka: This was a loose affiliation of small bands that 
operated from the port of Marka south of Mogadishu and other 
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smaller ports in the vicinity and engaged in smuggling as well as 
piracy, but with little capacity to operate much outside the 12nm 
limit of Somalia’s territorial waters. They were financed by Sheik 




 Haradheere-Hoboyo: The group based here changed the face 
of Somali piracy. Based between Hoboyo and Haradheere in the 
central Mudug region but with clear connections to Puntland via 
the port of Eyl, what became known as the “Somali Marines” 
began operations in 2005. The UN reported that it was organized 
along almost military lines: they identified a fleet admiral 
(Mohammed Ali Hassan), an admiral (Mohamed Osman), and a 
head of financial operations (Afweyne). Of these three, Afweyne 
was the most important. It might be no more than a coincidence 
that Puntland’s political leader, Abdullahi Yusuf, took over the 
presidency of the TFG in October 2004 and the Haradheere group 
took down its first ship in April 2005. The ship was an LPG carrier 
named the Feisty Gas; it earned them a ransom of around 
$300,000. The group appears to have been the product of a cross-
clan alliance between the Majerteen and the Suleiman with the 
Suleiman – the Afweyne family in particular – providing the 
business idea, financial acumen, and local connections that 
enabled the group to operate safely and at relatively little cost in 
the Mudug. The Majerteen, which effectively meant the political 
leadership around Yusuf, may have furnished the initial capital, 
political protection, and permission for Afweyne to hire 
experienced pirates from among the Puntland group to train new 
recruits. The group operated successfully and cohesively from the 
time of its first attack in April 2005 to the arrival of an Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU) force in August 2006. The pirates retreated 
north in the face of this advance but were back in action by 
November 2006, even before Ethipoia defeated the ICU in a short 
war starting in late December 2006.  
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Pirate Groups After 2006 
After the ICU interlude, pirate activity outside the Puntland-
Mudug axis declined. The groups that had operated out of Marka and 
Kismayo no longer appeared in reports, although occasional mention 
was made of a group operating out of Mogadishu. The Haradheere-
Hoboyo group’s original hierarchical structure appears to have 
dissolved and been replaced by several smaller groups networked 
loosely together through clan connections. Among these new groups 
were ones based on the neighboring Hawiye Sa’ad and Darood Omar 
Mahamoud sub-clans, the latter establishing Garad as a new piracy 
center.  
Since then, the Hardheere-Hoboyo group and its immediate 
clan-based imitators appear to have broken down further. Clan linkages 
and loyalties appear to have weakened and new, smaller, often ad hoc 
gangs have emerged whose clan allegiance is less clear cut. This 
change appears to have been driven by easier access to finance through 
what might reasonably be termed “piracy markets.” Financiers no 
longer appear to support one or two groups but instead entertain 
propositions from a range of pirate leaders who can put forward a 
credible business case.  
One consequence of this greater financial accessibility may 
have been an erosion of the remarkable sense of discipline that 
characterized Somali pirate operations starting in 2004. Between then 
and late 2010, hostages were protected. While their life was far from 
pleasant, they were rarely subject to anything worse than verbal threats. 
Starting in late 2010, freed hostages began to report more brutal 
treatment along the lines of what the Chandlers encountered, 
suggesting that the pirate model might be changing. To what extent this 
assessment was correct remained difficult to determine, as so few 
hostages were ever interviewed officially once they were released. In 
fact, shipping companies often discouraged their employees from 
talking about their experiences. The number of actual cases might have 
been low; alternatively, the practice might have become widespread. 





Nonetheless, what appeared to be taking place was that at least 
some pirates were willing to threaten hostages with violence and even 
torture in an effort to secure larger and/or more quickly paid payments. 
One school of thought suggested that this abuse was becoming 
systematic; greed was driving pirates to harm hostages deliberately in 
an attempt to force the insurers to pay higher ransoms, more speedily. 
A second school suggested that the greater availability of finance had 
encouraged the entrepreneurial formation of new bands built around 
one or more experienced pirate leaders, with the actual assaults 
conducted by recruits drawn from Somalia’s interior. These new 
arrivals were less well-trained and too eager for money to see the 
wisdom of the original business model. According to this 
interpretation, the essential problem was that the growth in pirate 
activity meant that the number of experienced pirates available to 
educate the new men and maintain discipline had exceeded supply. 
This school pointed to a developing shortage of navigators and boat 
handlers as another indicator that the original pool of experienced 
hands was becoming stretched. Reports suggested that in a few cases 
cases these key positions were being filled by contracted foreign 
nationals from Yemen, Pakistan, and India.
43
  
A third explanation was that the pirates’ turn to violence might 
be a rational—albeit misguided—response to the decline in their attack-
capture ratio, brought about by the navies’ more aggressive tactics and 
by better self-protection measures by merchant ships. Because they 
could capture fewer ships, the pirates had to achieve a better rate of 
return on a more limited number of captures. Consequently, they had to 
work the assets they did capture harder in order to secure ransoms that 
were larger and that were paid more quickly. The costs of holding 
hostages securely had also increased: the influx of ransom money was 
known to have increased inflation in the coastal areas where the pirates 
operated, with high prices being charged for food and, more 
importantly, for khat, the mild narcotic that the pirates consumed in 
large quantities. Hostages had always been at risk of being snatched by 
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other gangs, particularly at sea, but now the risk on land had increased, 
forcing pirates to pay for armed guards to protect their operations. 
 
D. Pirate Adaptation and Exploitation 
Somali pirates have proved to be masters of adaptation 
strategically and tactically, molding and remolding their methods to 
better exploit the chaos within Somalia and in the international 
maritime order, while remaining single-mindedly focused on making 
money from the difference between the value of human life within 
Somalia and without. Access to sanctuary has been crucial: they have 
been able to exploit states’ reluctance to become involved in the 
violence and disorder within Somalia as well as their general reluctance 
to intervene in another state’s affairs, however dysfunctional that state 
might be.  
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What pirate adaptations might we expect to see in the future? 
What naval escalations might we see as a result? 
2. How can naval forces change from reacting to pirates’ adaptive 
tactics to anticipating them? 
3. What might be some political ramifications of such a change? 
4. Would a decapitation strategy against pirate leaders yield 
results? What counter-measures could the pirates adopt? 
5. How could the pirate groups be induced to fight each other? 
6. What has been the effect of “catch and release” on naval 
policy? On naval effectiveness? 
7. Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has dropped 
significantly since mid-2000s. What factors account for this 
decline? Are they all security-related? What security measures 
adopted in Southeast Asia may be effective off Somalia? What 






Access to sanctuary also enabled the pirate groups to maximize 
their profits. Although isolated incidents of crew members being 
kidnapped had occurred in the Strait of Malacca in the 2000s, the 
pirates there found it difficult and probably relatively expensive to hold 
their captives for long. This was not the case in Somalia, where 
hostages could be held on board their own ships anchored off the coast 
in the relative certainty that no rescue attempt would be attempted, that 
no internal rescue would be mounted unless the authorities near where 
the ship was moored had not been paid, and that there were few rival 
groups who would attempt to steal them.  
The pirates would have to have been blind not to have quickly 
recognized that the states that sent ships to patrol Somali waters were 
exceedingly reluctant to put them in jail. As mentioned above, attention 
was first drawn to this in September 2008 when the HDMS Absalom 
returned ten pirates that it had captured, minus their equipment, to their 
departure point on the Somali coast. From then on, pirates knew that 
even if they were captured there was a good chance that the worst that 
was likely to happen was that they would be deprived of their guns, 
boarding ladders, communication devices, and possibly their skiffs. 
They would certainly be sent back to where they came from unharmed, 
quite possibly after having been given a medical check-up, and if they 
were sent back in their own skiff, they might even be given additional 
fuel to ensure they returned safely. To say they felt contempt for such 
weakness would not overstate their reaction. 
What they could also count on was that most ships were too 
slow or low in the water to defend or took inadequate self-protection 
measures. Despite the fact that the CGPCS Working Group 3 has been 
pushing hard, progress has been confined largely to well-run ships 
working for well-managed international ship operators. The bulk of 
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Because Somali pirates aim to take control of ships in order to 
capture their crews, their boarding tactics are markedly different from 
those practiced elsewhere. Pirates in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore were interested mainly in stealing money from the ship’s 
safe and the personal property of crew members; they boarded their 
targets surreptitiously and often left them without being discovered. If 
they were discovered, or needed to threaten the crew to obtain what 
they wanted, they used knives and machetes rather than guns. In cases 
such as those of the Petro Ranger in 1998 and the Alondra Rainbow in 
1999, where the intention was to steal the entire ship and its cargo, the 
pirates often placed accomplices on board before the ship sailed. Their 
job was to keep the raiding party apprised of the ship’s position and 
help them get onboard when the time came. The fate of the crew varied 
but was never pleasant: in some cases they were killed after they had 
served their purpose – this would undoubtedly have been the fate of the 
men on the Petro Ranger if the Chinese authorities had not intervened 
– and in others, such as the Alondra Rainbow, they were set adrift in 
the ship’s own lifeboat to fare as best they could.  
Off Somalia, pirates are prepared to make a surreptitious 
approach in some cases, but more often make no attempt to disguise 
their intentions. In some cases, such as the Maersk Alabama, discussed 
below, they issue a demand for a ship to stop. In others, they simply 
come alongside or circle the ship showing their weapons. If these 
warnings go unheeded, where once they fired in the air or across the 
ship’s bows, they will now fire on the accommodation block with AK-
47s and sometimes RPGs until it does. Speed has become important 
because pirates need to prevent ships’ crews from retreating into 
citadels, or fortified rooms, which take time to break down. The 
probability is that the gangs will begin to use plastic explosive, a safer 
and effective alternative. They use disguise and deception insofar that 
their mother ships are fishing craft, dhows or small freighters; when 
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they deploy, potential victims remain ignorant of an attack until pirates’ 
skiffs are heading toward them.  
It is a mistake to think of mother ships as a recent innovation; 
pirates have used them almost from the outset of piracy in the 1990s. 
Before late 2010, this usually meant forcing a small dhow or fishing 
vessel into serving as a base from which to launch attacks on larger 
vessels, often before letting it and its crew go once it had served its 
purpose (see the case of the Bonsella below).
45
 The innovation in late 
2010 was to use these much larger prizes with their crews on board as 
human shields, defying the navies to attack them. The increased size of 
these vessels also meant they could stay at sea longer, range 
transoceanically and carry a larger complement of pirates to defend the 
ship and overwhelm new prizes. It is therefore arguable that the more 
aggressive naval tactics initiated an action-reaction cycle that, instead 
of intimidating the pirates into inactivity, exposed existing hostages to 
new peril and increased the risk to seafarers on ships under attack and 
too isolated from naval protection to prevent pirates getting on board. 
 When confronted by armed teams, pirates have in the main 
moved on in search of less well-defended prey. It seems likely that at 
some stage they will seek to overcome armed defenses, probably at first 
through the use of superior numbers – who can collectively deliver 
superior fire-power – deployed from more skiffs, thus forcing 
defenders to engage multiple, fast-moving targets. Concern was 
expressed in 2011 that pirates would continue to use large captured 
freighters as mother ships, which they would equip with tripod-
mounted heavy weapons and maneuver into a position where they 
could fire down onto a target. However, this concern appears to have 
receded. Pirates seem to have decide that the greater anonymity offered 
by dhows is preferable to using the larger ships, which although 
offering greater carrying capacity and greater stability as firing 
platforms also have a greater signature and are therefore easier to track 
using aerial or space-based sensors. If the number of surveillance assets 
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in theatre are reduced in line with reductions in naval hull numbers, 
then, in the absence of any political strategy to defeat pirates on land, 
we might see pirates returning to the use of large ships, a move that will 
enable them to engage and quite possibly overcome even highly trained 
armed protective teams. 
 
E. Operational Analysis 
Although the UN described incidents between fishing vessels 
and pirates in the waters around Puntland in the later 1990s and early 
2000s as being like a war, until very recently no cargo ships have 
repulsed attacks using gunfire. Since then, security details have opined 
that warning shots could prove helpful without admitting anything. 
Again, until very recently, what kinetic action took place was 
largely one-way: outbound from naval ships towards pirate vessels with 
nothing but wild shooting in return. There have been nine main 
incidents, discussed below. 
 
Incident Involving the USS Cape St. George and the USS Gonzalez 
This incident (christened subsequently the “thousand-round 
incident”) took place in March 2006 between two US Navy ships, one a 
cruiser and the other a destroyer, and a Somali vessel towing two or 
three skiffs about 25nm (46km) off the coast. As this vessel-skiff 
combination was one of the few reliable indications of possible pirate 
activity, the vessel was ordered to stop. Those on board were seen to be 
armed with rifles and RPGs and when they reportedly fired on the US 
warships, fire was returned, leaving one pirate dead and their vessel 
burning. The pirates’ aggression might have been the product of the 
ingrained refusal on the part of some Somali males to be intimidated 
even by manifestly superior force, reinforced by a lack of prudence 
induced by khat consumption. As was often the case, the survivors 
claimed to be protecting fishermen. They subsequently were freed 






French SOF Raids 
French SOF have mounted one raid and two hostage rescues. 
The raid, which was mounted pursuant to the Le Ponant release in 
February 2008, has been described above. In August 2008 a yacht 
under pirate control on its way to Eyl, the Carre d’As, was stormed by 
30 men from Commando Hubert, a French SOF unit modelled on the 
US SEALs and Britain’s SBS. The 60-year old couple held on board 
were freed, one pirate killed, and three captured. The pirates were 
reportedly demanding a ransom of $1 million as well as freedom for the 
six men captured during the Le Ponant raid. The rescue was mounted 
from the Coubert (F712), a La Fayette-class frigate operating outside 
Somali territorial waters that had been shadowing the yacht for ten 
days, supported by a maritime reconaissance aircraft. Germany and 
Indonesia, both contributors to CTF-150 at the time, provided 
unspecified assistance.
46
 Rather less successful was the commando raid 
mounted in April 2009 to free a couple and their child held hostage 
aboard their yacht the Tanit. The commandos approached the yacht in 
rubber boats from two directions, and the pirates opened fire as soon as 
the raid was spotted. Two pirates and the child’s father, Florent 
Lemaçon, were killed and the surviving pirates captured. Chloé 
Lemaçon and the child were rescued unharmed. It was revealed later 





In November 2008 a Danish-registered cargo ship, the MV 
Powerful, was fired on by pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The pirates’ 
vessel, a hijacked Yemeni dhow, was intercepted by HMS Cumberland 
60nm off the Yemeni coast, and a Royal Marine boarding party 
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approached the pirate vessel. The mixed group of Somali and Yemeni 
pirates on board opened fire on the Marines and in the ensuing 
exchange two Somalis were killed. Another man, believed to be 
Yemeni, was found dead onboard, although it was unclear whether he 
was killed in the exchange of gunfire or had been shot earlier and died 
of his wounds. 
 
Maersk Alabama 
On April 8, 2009, the 1,100-TEU container ship the Maersk 
Alabama, part of the US Maritime Security Program, was hijacked 
400nm (741km) east of Mogadishu with US nationals and a USAid 
cargo of food supplies on board, on a regular run from Djibouti to 
Mombasa, Kenya. Following a prepared plan, the crew stopped the 
engines and retreated to a citadel below decks from where they could 
steer the ship. Using this as a base, they engaged the pirates in a five-
hour struggle that included steering the ship in a manner that swamped 
the pirates’ boat, stranding them on board. In the confusion, one pirate 
became separated from the rest of the gang and was taken prisoner by 
the crew. The remaining pirates retreated over the side to the ship’s 
lifeboat, but failed to start its engine. Richard Phillips, the Maersk 
Alabama’s captain, accompanied by the captured pirate, entered the 
lifeboat to help them. At this point, the pirates reneged on whatever 
deal had been agreed, taking the captain hostage. The crew 
immediately began to negotiate with the pirates in the lifeboat.  
A P-3 maritime patrol aircraft was monitoring the situation 
from the air, and the nearest US warship, the USS Bainbridge, which 
had been 300nm (556km) away at the start of the incident, arrived on 
the scene on April 9. Other ships joined the USS Bainbridge, including 
the guided-missile frigate USS Halyburton and an amphibious assault 
ship the USS Boxer. They interposed their hulls between the lifeboat 
and the Somali coast, plied it with high-pressure hoses, and positioned 
a helicopter immediately above to engulf it in its powerful downdraft. 
After the pirate leader sustained an injury and requested medical 
assistance, he was taken on board the Bainbridge. The navy’s harassing 





until it was dead in the water. After venting their frustration by firing 
on the US ships with AK-47s, they requested food and water. This 
request was granted. Without power, the lifeboat could only drift and in 
the rough sea was moving violently. At this point, they demanded that 
the US Navy tow them to Somalia.  
A line was put in place but, instead of heading for the coast, the 
Navy gradually brought the lifeboat closer to the Bainbridge’s fantail 
and within range of SEAL snipers. Given permission to fire if they 
believed Captain’s Phillip’s life was in danger, the snipers did so on 
April 12, killing three pirates and ending a 96-hour standoff. The pirate 
who had been taken on board the Bainbridge was flown to New York 
for trial and on February 16, 2011, was sentenced to 33 years and 9 
months in prison. 
 
Quest 
The Quest was a small yacht, home to Scott and Jean Adams, 
two Americans who were sailing it around the world, and Phyllis 
Mackay and Bob Riggle, friends who had joined them for the voyage 
across the northern Arabian Sea. In February 2011, it was hijacked by 
pirates off the coast of Oman. The Americans knew they were entering 
pirate-populated waters and had joined up with a sail race called the 
Blue Water Rally, which offered them protection in numbers. On 
February 15, however, they broke away from the group and headed 
towards the Omani coast for reasons that are not understood.
48
 There is 
some suggestion that they might have been experiencing some 
mechanical problems. Alternatively, they may have felt they were close 
enough to Oman to make the relatively short journey alone. Whatever 
their reasoning, it was a mistake. 
Nineteen pirates boarded the yacht and began to sail it slowly 
back to Somalia. It was intercepted by the USS Sterett, a guided-missile 
destroyer about 150nm off Cape Guardafui. Two pirates agreed to be 
taken on board the Sterett to negotiate. When the FBI negotiators 
decided the men were not acting in good faith, they detained them and 
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told the men on board the yacht to send someone who could talk 
seriously. Unfortunately, the pirates may have pondered the fate of the 
Maersk Alabama hostage takers; only a week before, a 33-year 
sentence had been handed down to the one pirate who had survived. 
Young and inexperienced, possibly high on khat and now leaderless, 
with one US warship less than half a mile away and three more in sight, 
including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the USS Enterprise, the 
pirates attempted to contact their bosses in Puntland.  
The details of what happened next is the subject of an 
investigation. Shots rang out, not from a naval vessel towards the 
pirates, but on board the hijacked yacht. A RPG round was then fired at 
the USS Sterett, possibly in the same desperate spirit. Thirteen pirates 
seemed to recognize their plight and came on deck with their hands 
raised. Navy SEALS, whose speedy arrival suggests they were ready to 
make an assault long before the shooting began, arrived to find two 
more pirates dead and two more in hiding. They shot one and killed the 
second in a close-quarters knife fight. The four Americans, who they 
had come to save, lay shot and dying.
49
 
Serious questions have been raised about the strategy followed 
by the FBI hostage negotiating team; in particular, whether it was 
prudent to separate the pirates from their immediate leaders by 
detaining them on board the Sterett and, it has been suggested, cutting 
their link to their senior leaders ashore. That these links were being 
monitored can be assumed from the fact that the on-land negotiator was 
picked up later and spirited back to the US for trial.
50
 
Defiant statements from pirates after they have experienced 
violent setbacks have become common. Threats to attack both French 
and American ships were issued after the Le Ponant and Maersk 
Alabama incidents, but nothing came of them. However, the threats 
issued after the Quest may have signaled a new attitude toward 
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hostages. In particular, a pirate named Muse Abdi said that killing 
hostages “has now become part of our rules,” while another told 
reporters only minutes before the killings took place that “the hostages 
will be the first to go.” Ominously, another pirate who gave his name as 
Bile Hussain said it was a “black day for us and also the Americans, but 
they lost bigger than us.”
51
 To what degree this was bravado, words 
calculated carefully to resonate with Western values and Western fears, 
or a real change of attitude will only be revealed over time. However, 
pirate attitudes toward hostages did appear to be changing, with those 
from states that had taken violent action against them being singled out 
for special treatment. 
 
Comparisons can be invidious, yet nonetheless reflect real 
differences. The reticence with which the members of the various 
Western coalitions – CTF-151, NATO, and the EU—have used 
violence stands in contrast with other states that have chosen to keep 
their forces under national control. There also appears to be a greater 




Somali pirates hijacked an oil tanker named the Moscow 
University off the Yemimi coast in May 2010. Russian naval forces 
aboard the warship Marshal Shaposhidov were accused of setting the 
hijackers adrift with little or no means of returning to the coast safely, 
or of killing them by placing their bodies aboard their own boat and 
then blowing it up. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the pirates 
ashore appeared to take the charges seriously and threatened a tit-for-tat 
response. A Russian spokesman denied the allegations categorically, 
saying that they had returned the pirates to their boat but had given then 
adequate supplies and had not intended to kill them.
52
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On January 15, 2011, the MV Samho Jewelry was pirated 
approximately 350nm southeast of Muscat, Oman. The 20,000-
tonne product tanker was carrying chemicals. It was Maltese-flagged, 
Norwegian-owned, and had a crew of 21 drawn from South Korea, 
Burma, and Indonesia. It was the second Samho Shipping Company 
ship to be hijacked; the Samho Dream, a VLCC with $170 million of 
crude oil aboard, had been hijacked in April 2010 and was not released 
until November, for what was then a record ransom of $9.5 million. 
The South Korean government was clearly unwilling to see this 
repeated. A South Korean destroyer tracked the Samho Jewelry for 
several days as the pirates attempted to use it as a mother ship from 
which to attack other vessels, ignoring repeated demands that they 
surrender. South Korean SOF approached the ship on January 21 and 
once aboard confronted the pirates. Three soldiers were wounded, and 
the ship’s captain suffered an abdominal wound. The South Korean 
military said they had mounted the raid because they believed the 
pirates were exhausted after the long standoff, while also admitting that 
the battle had lasted five hours. It is perhaps worth noting that the 
violent intervention took place after North Koreans had shelled a small 
South Korean island in November 2010, and President Lee Myung-bak 





The incident involving the INS Tabar, which attacked a Thai-
owned trawler that was being used as a pirate mother ship in November 
2008 even though its crew was still aboard, will be discussed in the 
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following section. In February 2011, the Indian Navy cornered another 
captured fishing vessel with men from Burma and Thailand aboard that 
was being used as a mother ship, in this case close to the Laccadives, a 
group of small islands roughly 100 to 240nm off the southwest coast of 
the Indian mainland. The 28 pirates on board surrendered after only a 
brief exchange of fire and were taken to Bombay for trial.
54
 Barely a 
month later, the Indian Navy attacked another mother ship, the 
Mozambique trawler Vega 5, which had been used as a base for several 
piracy attempts. The navy approached the ship nearly 700nm off 
southern India and was fired upon. Fire was returned, and 61 pirates 
together with the original crew jumped into the sea to flee the burning 
ship.
55
 The navy later discovered that 25 of the pirates were under 15 
years old and, of these, four were no more than 11.
56
 As with the Quest, 
the pirate organizers in Somalia threatened to take revenge on Indian 
seamen: Bile Hussain, the same spokesman as in the Quest case, was 
reported as saying that the Indian government must “release our friends 
in their hands or else they have to be ready for their citizens to be 
mistreated in the near future.”
57
 Within a month it appeared that the 
pirates were prepared to make good on this threat: when the crew of the 
UAE-owned Asphalt Venture were released upon payment of ransom 
after seven months in captivity, six of the 15 Indian crew members 
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In March 2011, a group of between 30 and 50 pirates seized an 
Indonesian-owned and -flagged bulk carrier, the Sinar Kudus, about 
320nm north east of Socotra, a Yemeni island in the Indian Ocean. In 
April, Indonesia announced that it had deployed two frigates with 400 
embarked marines to protect the ship and crew following its release. 
Once the ransom, reputed to be between $3 million and $4.5 million, 
was agreed upon and the pirates had left the ship, the Indonesian 





III. Counterpiracy  
 
A. Naval Presence 
Limited naval anti-piracy operations began in 2006, following 
the November 2005 attack on the U.S.-owned cruise liner the Seabourn 
Spirit. UN Security Council resolutions made it easier for states to send 
warships to the region, and from mid-2008 onwards vessels from the 
U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and Pakistan 
began to undertake operations. At the beginning, the level of 
cooperation was generally rudimentary. Communication between 
established allies well-versed in each other’s methods such as the U.S. 
and U.K. was close and routine, but other navies found communication 
more difficult. Differing rules of engagement also presented problems, 
with some states allowing their commanders at sea to take more 
decisive action than others. The three missions that were assembled to 
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1. The key variable in limiting pirate effectiveness appears to be 
ship self-protection, not naval deterrence or faster naval 
reaction times. What lessons can navies learn from this? How 
might it affect their relations with civilian ship owners and 
crews? 
2. Some in naval circles have suggested that US reluctance to 
engage pirates on land has been based on a calculated 
assessments of relevant operational factors; other have 
suggested it has been postponed by three words: “Black Hawk 
Down.” Which explanation appears to explain the facts best? 
3. What are the implications of independent actors within the task 
force structure? What are its advantages and disadvantages? 
4. Apart from counterpiracy efforts, what are other advantages of 
ongoing cooperative naval operations? Are these advantages 
worthwhile even if the counterpiracy efforts are less than 
successful? 
5. What alternative naval force structure might achieve the same 




The NATO mission Operation Allied Provider was the first to 
be stood up. It was established to provide close protection for World 
Food Program (WFP) aid ships to Somalia in October 2008, following 
the hijacking of the cargo ship MV Faina.
60
 The mission consisted of 
four ships drawn from Standing NATO Maritime Group Two 
(SNMG2) under the command of Allied Maritime Component 
Command Naples and lasted from October 24, 2008 to December 12, 
2008.
61
 The mission was spurred by the concerns expressed about 
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Somali piracy by several European governments and was intended to 
be an interim measure until the EU could stand up its own operation. 
Somali pirate activity had interfered with relief operations, and it had 
only been possible for them to continue prior to the NATO mission 
because France, Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands had each 
unilaterally agreed to deploy warships to protect deliveries for a limited 
period.  
At the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Krakow, Poland in 
February 2009, it was decided to extend the mission mandate for an 
unspecified period under the designation Operation Allied Protector. It 
involved the diversion of Standing NATO Maritime Group One 
(SNMG1) when it was on its way to a training exercise in the Far East 
and Australia. The deployment commenced in August 2009, with ships 
from the U.S., U.K., Greece, Italy, and Turkey controlled from 
NATO’s Joint Command Headquarters in Lisbon.  
In August 2009, Operation Allied Protector was replaced by 
Operation Ocean Shield under the command of SNMG2. The mission’s 
stated aim was to bring “a distinctive NATO role based on the broad 
strength of the Alliance by adopting a more comprehensive approach to 
counter-piracy efforts”; the specific intention was to help local states 
build the capacity to combat piracy activities with minimal external 
assistance, in order to create a “lasting maritime security solution off 
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The EU mission was announced in October 2008. When it was 
stood up in December 2008 as EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, it 
became the second piracy-specific international mission to be deployed 
in Somali waters.
63
 Like the NATO mission, it consisted of seven 
warships drawn from France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and 
Spain, supported by contributions from Portugal, Sweden, and non-EU 
member Norway, operating under British command from the 
Permanent Joint Headquarters facility at Northwood, just outside 
London. It was intended to replace the NATO mission with “no voids 
and no duplication.”
64
 Both Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s Secretary-
General, and Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, stressed the need for cooperation. As part 
of its effort, EU NAVFOR also established the Maritime Security 
Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA), an online reporting center for 
shipping transiting the region, which provided a useful website that 
supplemented existing reporting centers provided by the U.K. 
(Maritime Trade Office, Dubai) and the U.S. (Maritime Liaison Office, 
Bahrain). In June 2009, the EU Council agreed to extend the 
operation’s mandate for a further year until December 2010. It was 
renewed again, taking authorization through to 2014. 
The deployment of the NATO and EU NAVFOR forces gave 
the impression that the missions had as much, if not more, to do with 
demonstrating the effectiveness of two essentially competitive 
organizations than with finding solutions to Somali piracy. The EU 
mission also effectively advanced its claim to a role in foreign and 
security affairs that was separate and above those of its member states. 
In July 2009, the EU declared that like NATO it would become 
involved in capacity building by sending a mission to train the TFG’s 
newly created anti-piracy force. In March 2010, the EU went further 
when it announced it would shift at least some of its attention away 
from the protection of WFP ships in order to disrupt the operations of 
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the pirates’ mother ships as the waters calmed down at the end of the 
northeast monsoon season.
65
 This resulted in the “full court press” 
operation mentioned previously, which between October and 
November 2010 spread out 14 EU ships along the Somali coast at 
50nm intervals, each one positioned between five and 30 miles 
offshore, to interdict pirate ships departing the coast. The response of 




The third cooperative mission, Combined Task Force (CTF) 
151, was established in January 2009 by the U.S. Navy. It was a spin-
off from CTF-150, which had been established in 2001 as part of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OAF) to track possible al Qaeda and 
related movements between Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. To 
accomplish this counterterrorism mission, CFT-150 usually deployed 
about 14 warships and a supply vessel to cover 2.5 million square miles 
of ocean, not just off Somalia but also the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian 
Sea, the Red Sea and large parts of the Indian Ocean. CTF-150 only 
became involved in counter-piracy operations following the 2005 
attack on the Seabourn Spirit. Senior U.S. naval commanders have 
consistently been concerned that this supplementary activity has been a 
distraction from what continued to be its primary mission. Equally, 
some states, particularly Germany, which were reluctant to tackle 
piracy as part of an OAF-related mission, found it much easier to join a 
coalition effort that was more clearly differentiated.  
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Forces Under National Control 
In order to avoid placing allied officers commanding CTF-150 
in difficult positions politically, the U.S. Navy sometimes placed its 
own ships under national control. The USS Winston S. Churchill, for 
example, was operating under national control when it apprehended 
pirates in January 2006. The announcement that NATO would be 
sending a standing force into the Indian Ocean for the first time in its 
history spurred a number of other nations to send warships to the 
region. In October 2008, Russia, some of whose citizens had been 
seized by pirates when the Svitzer Korsakov and Faina were hijacked, 
issued a statement saying it would be sending a warship with support 
craft to the region that would cooperate with US and EU forces. In 
December 2008, China announced it would be sending a task force 
consisting of two destroyers and a supply ship after a Chinese-flagged 
vessel, the Zhenhua 4, fought off an attack in the Gulf of Aden. In 
January 2009, Japan announced it would make a similar commitment 
despite the pacifist clauses in its constitution; two destroyers arrived in 
the area in March and were replaced in July by two others that had been 
issued with what were described as “expanded rules of engagement.”  
India had announced in October 2008 that it would send ships 
to guard Indian-flagged vessels and Indian seamen who had come 
under attack and been held hostage; it was exercised particularly by the 
September 2008 seizure of the MT Stolt Valor with 18 Indian nationals 
on board. That November, the INS Tabar fired on what was described 
as a suspect pirate vessel. However, it turned out to be the Ekawat Nava 
5, a Thai fishing vessel that had been hijacked by pirates for use as a 
mother ship with the original crew still on board. The pirates reportedly 
opened fire that the Tabar returned, causing explosions on board that 
the Indian Navy ascribed to exploding ammunition. There were no 
reports that the Indian ship stopped to pick up survivors.
66
 According to 
the only fisherman to come through the ordeal, he and all but two of the 
hijacked crew were tied up on deck when the attack started. He 
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managed to escape overboard and drifted at sea for six days before 
being rescued and taken to Yemen. Although forceful action against 
pirates is frequently justified and often required, this incident illustrates 
how necessary it is to acquire as accurate a picture as possible of the 
potential situation prior to any engagement, and that when hostages are 
involved, their lives are often more at risk than the pirates’.  
Other states that sent warships to the region at various times 
include Australia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and 
South Korea. As a consequence of the coalition naval initiatives and the 
contributions made by states on an individual basis, the number of 
warships involved in anti-piracy operations in the region, always a 
figure that was hard to pin down because of the frequent transfers in 




Pirate groups have always aimed to make money. They have no 
other agenda. They do not engage in piracy to advance clan or other 
political interests, nor do they support terrorist causes. If money passed 
from pirates to Islamists, it was paid to keep them off their backs, as it 
was paid to political and clan figures elsewhere. 
The attitude of militant Islamist groups appears to be more 
opaque. Publically, they say that piracy is “un-Islamic” and that they 
will stamp it out. Hizbul Islam took a similar position in 2009, saying 
that if they found the Chandlers they would release them unharmed. 
Groups that may have been part of Hizbul Islam, were ex-Hizbul Islam, 
or conceivably al-Shabaab, on the other hand, appeared willing to take 
what they could from pirates by threatening to disrupt their operations 
unless they paid what amounted to protection money. There have also 
been unconfirmed reports that pirates have operated out of the southern 
al-Shabaab-controlled port of Kismayo or at least obtained supplies 
from there. If true, this suggests some connivance in their activities but 









1. There is evidence that some Somali pirates have aided the al-
Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. Does this justify using 
counterterrorism measures against the pirates? 
2. If an alliance between Somali pirates and al-Qaeda were to 
expand, would this trigger a more pronounced response from 
the United States? Would this threat of greater US action deter 
a pirate/al-Qaeda affiliation? 
3. What economic alternatives to piracy exist currently? How 
could these be developed and new opportunities started to the 
point that would offer a viable option to piracy? What political 
and security measures would need to be enacted to making 
these developments sustainable? 
4. What actions could be taken against the financial interests of 
pirate organizers and their clan patrons, either directly or 
indirectly, in Somalia or abroad? 
5. Is China’s involvement in counter-piracy operations a positive 
or negative from the U.S. perspective? 
6. What actions could be taken against the financial interests of 
pirate organizers and their patrons, either directly or indirectly? 
7. Has the counter-piracy operations of Somalia exposed flaws in 




Piracy has historically been a crime with a strong political 
dimension. Although most local and regional naval commanders placed 
the safety of seafarers and the suppression of pirate activity at the 
center of their mission, many foreign and defense ministries back home 
ensured from the outset that political considerations overshadowed 
their efforts. This was demonstrated most obviously in their preference 





However, it also extended to the suspicion that several navies 
were using piracy operations as a way of gaining credibility on the 
international stage. China and Russia in particular were using the 
deployment to learn (or re-learn) the practicalities of transoceanic 
operations and to observe how navies that were already well-versed in 
such operations, such as those of the US, the UK, and France, managed 
their activities. The consequent concern was that if this experience 
proved successful, the Chinese in particular might be encouraged to 
expand their power projection capability—that the lasting consequence 
of Somali piracy might be that it gave new navies the operational 
experience they needed to accelerate their development. If this might be 
the eventual outcome, it would be eventually unavoidable. Open-
handed engagement in the meantime could prompt China to become a 
positive player in international maritime security, fulfilling the 
constructive role that its economic power and international trading 
interests warranted, which is what the US Navy was hoping to foster. 
There is also a lack of mutual appreciation between the navies 
and the merchant marines, verging on distrust. Whatever the ultimate 
reasons for their presence, the navies do try to counter piracy as 
effectively as they can. They are, however, woefully short on ship 
numbers and subject to rules of engagement (ROE) that restrict what 
they can do. Spyros Polemis, the chairman of the International 
Chamber of Shipping, described the “current military response,” for 
which “only a handful of navy ships” were available to provide 
protection on any given day, as amounting to no more that a “sticking 
plaster on a gaping wound,” and charged that governments had “failed 
to protect shipping, and the smooth flow of world trade, from being 
literally held to ransom by Somali criminals.”
67
 They have therefore 
urged merchant ships to adopt more and more vigorous self-protection 
measures and have begun to imply that vessels that do not do so are at 
fault if and when they are attacked and captured.  
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However, when they check in with MSC-HOA, ships that 
admit that they have an armed protection detachment on board are 
regarded as being at less risk that those without and are therefore 
accorded a lower protection status. This assessment might be fair, but it 
also encourages ships to be less than honest about their true status. 
While sensible measures have proved effective at deterring pirates, who 
to date have chosen the easiest available targets, a tone has entered the 
discourse reminiscent of that voiced by underresourced and ineffective 
police departments who blame householders for being robbed rather 
than their own low standards of law enforcement. Some commentators 
have taken a similar line, suggesting that as ship owners have sought to 
register their ships with flags that offer the most appropriate balance of 
tax regimen and technical standards, they are somehow avoiding their 
responsibilities and, consequently, have no right to call for help. Lax 
and irresponsible ship owners of course exist, but there are just as 
many, if not more, ship owners who cannot attain the highest operating 
standards yet strive to operate within the law. International shipping is 
a cost-sensitive business; it has achieved historically unparalleled levels 
of efficiency, which has made the cost of marine transport a negligible 
proportion of the unit cost of most products and raw materials shipped 
by sea. The demand that ships increase their level of self-protection, 
and even embark armed guards, reverses the progress that began 200 
years ago with the disarming of merchant vessels in peacetime as the 
piracy threat declined. Merchant mariners increasingly take the views – 
rarely expressed in public – either that navies have become so 
preoccupied with power projection that they are no longer attuned to 
trade protection and have therefore become blind to the threat the 
Somali pirates represent, or, more mundanely, that if navies are under-
prepared or under-equipped for the trade protection mission, shipping 
companies should not be expected to pay taxes and pay what it takes to 
protect their ships themselves. It is a milder version of Hastings’ 
judgment on the Royal Navy’s impotence with the Chandlers’ 
abduction: if navies cannot defend national interests and their own 





To condemn the navies alone, however, would be unjust. States 
have always been reluctant to take action against pirates. The reasons 
and the evasions given to explain this lack of resolve naturally vary 
from case to case, but the underlying justification is largely consistent: 
short of a larger political imperative, piracy’s political and economic 
costs are too insignificant to warrant taking action. This reluctance has 
been in display off Somalia and resulted in naval action that has been 
hesitant, has relied on rudimentary coordination, and has often been 
self-serving. Resolution of coordination issues between the various 
multinational naval task forces and ships from countries such as China, 
Russia, Japan, and India, which remained under national control, 
awaited the introduction of a process known as Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction (SHADE) in October 2009.  
Hesitancy and poor coordination can be seen at work in the 
Chandler’s case. The ROE under which the Wave Knight operated 
contributed to the lack of effective action, while the apparent delay in 
dispatching the SBS team from the UK meant it arrived in theatre too 
late to affect the outcome. Viewed more generally, many states 
instructed their navies not to detain pirates if they caught them at sea, 
even if they were in possession of incriminating paraphernalia.  
The three most important practical benefits of the naval 
presence were (1) to complicate the operating picture for the pirates, 
and, (2) when they were sufficiently close to an incident to be able to 
react in time, either force the pirates to break off their attack or (3) 
capture them, when enough navies had modified their rules to 
engagement to permit this. To enhance their chances of success and to 
decrease the pirates’ options, the US Navy, working with its Coalition 
partners in CTF-150 and the IMO, established a maritime security 
patrol area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden in July 2008 with eastbound 
and westbound Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors 
(IRTCs).
68
 This extended for 464 nm (860 km) along the Yemeni coast, 
from a point just west of the Bab al-Mandeb to a point roughly north of 
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 In February 2009, the patrol area was moved a short distance 
further away from the Yemeni coast in an attempt to prevent pirates 
from hiding among Yemeni fishing craft, and the coordinates changed 
again in September 2009.
70
 The intention was not to convoy ships, but 
to group them together for greater safety and to space them in ways that 
would optimize a warship’s chances of reaching them, usually with its 
helicopter, before pirates had taken control.
71
  
What it failed to do was to stop piracy. In their statistical study, 
Percy and Shortland conclude that naval action had a clear deterrent 
effect, but that this lasted only a short time. If a naval vessel succeeded 
in disrupting an attack but the pirates escaped, another attack would 
take place in the same area between 24 and 48 hours later. The danger 
period in the Somali Basin remained high for 24 to 96 hours.
72
 
However, while their figures are similar to those generated by ONI, the 
explanation that deterrence is responsible is doubtful. Starting in 2009, 
ONI issued a warning after every credibly reported failed attack that 
another was probable within 48 hours or 50 nm.  
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In fact, the whole notion of naval deterrence is questionable. 
While it was true that the pirates found it harder to succeed as a 
consequence of the introduction and refinement of the IRTCs, more 
naval patrols, and the improved self-protection measures taken by 
merchant ships, these all came along at more or less the same time, 
making it difficult to determine which had the greater effect. It was 
reasonable to assume that better self-protection measures at least 
bought time for naval forces to move close enough to be able to 
respond when merchant ships were under attack. Given that pirate 
success rates dropped off in the Indian Ocean, where the IRTCs did not 
exist and naval protection was largely absent (although admittedly not 
to the same degree as in the Gulf of Aden), however, improved self-
protective measures appeared to be a key variable, not deterrence or 
faster naval reaction times. If this conclusion is true, then the 
justification for a continuing naval presence as constituted currently 
must be open to doubt, as must be the assertion that it will bring piracy 
to an end. 
Neither can the cost of this presence be ignored. The annual 
cost of maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden-Horn of 
Africa region is estimated at over $1.82 billion, based on an average 
daily availability of 29 ships dedicated to counter-piracy operations.. It 
is hard to justify this solely on the basis of preventing pirates snatching 
between $40 million and $80 million in ransoms. Much larger figures 
to cover all losses have thus been suggested based on a poorly defined 
list that includes items such as additional fuel, loss of fees for transiting 
the Suez Canal, and added insurance premiums. Calculating how much 
is lost to piracy worldwide has produced a range of figures over the 
years, none of which have any empirical foundation.
73
  
In truth, piracy is less economically harmful today than it was 
in the past. A recent study suggests that, taking all possible categories 
of loss into account, piracy costs the world economy between $7 billion 
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and $12 billion a year.
74
 In the context of world trade measured in 
trillions of dollars, this amounts to little more than a rounding error. 
Stephen Carmel has pointed out that the Barbary pirates “had a more-
or-less established rate for ransom of roughly $4,000 per person. Today 
that would be roughly $1.5 million per person, which would translate to 
a total ship ransom in the range of $29 million – not the $2.1 million 
the Somali pirates averaged per ship in 2009.”
75
 Given the historically 
demonstrable link between piracy and economics, it comes as no 
surprise that without clear proof that the cost of an outbreak is placing 
an intolerable burden on their interests, states have felt free to take little 
or no action against it, although such calculations take no account of 
the loss or death of seafarers and the misery inflicted on their families.  
The question marks that hang over navies’ ability to suppress 
piracy are hardly surprising: there were never enough warships to 
effectively cover the pirates’ operating areas in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean, which extended over two and a half million square miles 
of open sea – roughly the size of Western Europe from the coast of 
Portugal to the borders of Russia - traversed every year by 30,000 
commercial vessels on average.
76
 A number of navies, the US Navy in 
particular, repeatedly made the point that stopping piracy was not an 
outcome they could bring about.
77
 History was on their side: piracy has 
never been defeated unless its sponsors on land have been arrested, 
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defeated, bribed, or agreed to a political settlement based on a 
combination of these elements.  
In late 2007, perhaps with this knowledge in mind, the US Fifth 
Fleet suggested that US Marines should conduct a simultaneous raid on 
all the known piracy bases. Even though the goal would have been to 
destroy boats and infrastructure, not to kill or capture pirates, the 
request was denied. It was stopped by the use of three short words: 
“Black Hawk down.” The decision appears a poor one in retrospect, as 
pirate activity, and pirate profits, reached new heights in the months 
that followed. A strike at that point could have been psychologically 
decisive. But piracy is inseparable from politics, something that is as 
true in Somalia as it has been elsewhere. The decision not to proceed 
would have been redeemed had decisive political action been initiated 
instead. It was not. The Bush administration again floated the idea of 
coastal raids in late 2008 but this time, given greater international 
presence, felt the need to win the support of its partners. They 
responded coolly. The deciding factor, however, was that the 
intelligence agencies were unable to supply sufficiently accurate 
information to make the raids worthwhile.
78
  
Somalis are suspicious of strangers. Foreigners stand out. This 
makes intelligence difficult to gather, but not impossible. The US 
preference for technical collection methods would appear to be the 
optimal solution. Pirate bases or encampments, insofar as they exist, are 
readily identifiable from the air. However, finding and locating bases 
that as a matter of policy cannot be attacked adds little to an 
understanding of pirate operations. Moreover, although pirate ships – or 
Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) as the navies for some unfathomable 
reason want to call them – can be tracked as they depart Somalia, this is 
not enough. They need to be tracked continuously as they move into the 
Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and this does not appear to be happening 
to the extent necessary. It can be done using commercially available 
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surveillance approach radar and optical surveillance systems; the cost is 
high but not, relatively speaking, exorbitant. The question remains, 
nonetheless, who will pay? More importantly, an understanding of 
pirate dynamics ashore needs to be developed, together with the 
identity and practices of pirate leaders and financiers. Somalia has a 
sophisticated cell phone network that can be tapped by vessels 
patrolling offshore and from space, but any information harvested from 
this source needs to be assessed by someone familiar with neuro-
linguistic programming and Somali culture to determine truth from 
deception. People with both sets of skills are available, although they 
appear to be woefully underemployed. In addition, the US focus on 
countering terrorism appears to have meant that few, if any, contacts 
have been fostered among pirate groups or those familiar with their 
operations. Yet these people too are not hard to find. 
 
 
C. Lack of Political Engagement 
In contrast with historical experience, the current approach is 
characterized by a lack of policy engagement, an overreliance on naval 
patrols, and an overconcentration on judicial solutions. The 
international response has also suffered from weak or nonexistent 




1. The naval operation off Somali can be regarded as a failure 
compared to the naval operations of Bosnia, Iraq and East 
Timor. Why? 
2. What is the role of Special Operations Forces in contending 
with piracy? 






4. Are civilian casualties – either among the Somali population or 
the hostages – justified if it brought piracy to an end? If so, 
what level of casualties would be acceptable, and how could 
the policy to be sold to key constituencies, e.g., seafarers’ 
families? 
 
The root cause of these problems has been widespread 
international indifference to the fate of Somalia post-1995 when the last 
UN forces left the country. American indifference has been driven 
largely by the horrific outcome of the battle of Mogadishu in 1993, 
which has reportedly paralyzed more than one policy initiative, 
including proposed raids against piracy encampments. American 
reluctance to become involved in Somalia – above and beyond the bare 
minimum needed to hunt down the perpetrators of the 1998 East 
African embassy bombings – has been cemented by the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which have consumed national resources, political 
reputations and official attention at an alarming rate. 
Apart from the need to respond to the occasional high-profile 
incident – for the US the hijacking of the Maerk Alabama, for the 
French the Le Ponant, and for the British the predicament of the 
Chandlers (although its response was noticeably low-key following the 
navy’s initial failures) – policy and its implementation across all states 
have largely failed to involve the highest level of government. Powers 
have been content to engage with Somalia though the medium of the 
United Nations and its agencies such as FAO, the IMO, and the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The consequence has been 
continuing support for the TFG, the ineffective central government, a 
continuing refusal to grant international recognition to Somaliland, only 
half-hearted attempts to deal constructively with the admittedly 
untrustworthy political leaders of Puntland, and the development of 
various international initiatives of which the most prominent have been 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the 





The CGPCS was created on January 14, 2009, in response to 
UNSC 1851. It is described as a “voluntary, ad-hoc forum” at which 
nearly 60 states and organizations—including the African Union, the 
EU, NATO, and various UN bodies—and representatives of the 
maritime-related industries such as shipping and insurance can 
coordinate political, naval, and other responses to Somali-based piracy. 
It has five working groups that meet regularly at various locations 
around the world: Military and Operational Coordination, Information 
Sharing, and Capacity Building, chaired by the United Kingdom; 
Judicial Issues, chaired by Denmark; Strengthening Shipping Self-
Awareness and Other Capabilities, chaired by the United States; Public 




The Djibouti Code of Conduct (or, to give it is full title, the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden) was signed on January 29, 2009 by nine regional states. 
A further eight have signed subsequently, bringing the total to 17 out of 
the 21 eligible to accede. The signatories have agreed to co-operate to 
advance: 
 The investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons or people 
suspected of perpetrating or aiding piracy;  
 The interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and equipment; 
 The rescue of ships, persons, and property subject to piracy and 
armed robbery; and 
 The conduct of shared operations such as the provision of 
“shipriders,” i.e., law enforcement officials embarked on the naval 
vessels of another signatory. 
 
In addition, the Code provides for information sharing. To 
facilitate this, it has enabled construction of three new centers: two 
dedicated to rescue coordination in Mombasa, Kenya and 
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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (a sub-center) and one dedicated to maritime 
information in Sana’a, Yemen. Other aspects of the Code cover the 
implementation of adequate anti-piracy legislation and the provision of 
support and assistance by extra-regional powers.
80
  
Both initiatives reflect an international aspiration to replicate 
off of the coast of Somalia what is seen as a successful institutional 
solution to piracy in Southeast Asia, even though the two situations 
differ markedly. Until the recent rise in Somali piracy, Indonesia was 
the most pirate-prone nation on Earth. Most piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca originated in Indonesia. For reasons outsiders need not agree 
with but can understand, Indonesia did not place a high political 
priority on piracy suppression and greatly resented the international 
criticism that flowed from this decision. Japan made persistent efforts 
to cajole Indonesia and other littoral states in the region to take firmer 
action. By 2001, Tokyo had secured agreement for the establishment of 
ReCAAP (the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) but substantial action was 
not undertaken until after the US proposed the Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004 and the Joint War Committee of 
Lloyd’s of London designated parts of the Malacca Strait a war zone 
for insurance purposes in 2005.
81
 It was these two pressures – the 
suggestion that the United States would deploy naval forces and 
Marines to the Straits to deal with the problem unilaterally, and the 
imposition by Lloyd’s of an economic cost that the littoral states could 
not disguise, manipulate, or ignore – that prompted Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia to take action jointly to head off unacceptable 
international interference and to breathe effective life into ReCAAP’s 
cooperative procedures. Several other factors had arguably greater 
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impact, of which the most significant probably was the Chinese 
government’s 1998 clampdown on internal corruption that closed the 
market for pirated goods in southern China.  
The critical point is that the littoral states of Southeast Asia had 
functioning governments that were open to international persuasion and 
assistance and could take steps of varying effectiveness to address the 
piracy problem. They were reasonable interlocutors, whose existence 
meant maritime states could work with littoral states that responded to 
political pressure and financial inducement.  
The situation in the Horn of Africa is not comparable. Somalia 
is a failed state. The other states in the region have varying levels of 
governmental competence, but all lack the economic resources to tackle 
the problem. Regional consultative mechanisms are weakened by local 
rivalries, most particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both of which 
have interfered in Somalia’s domestic politics in pursuit of their own 
interests. The larger regional players, the AU and the Arab League, are 
interested in the political problem of Somalia but have little interest in 
piracy. There is a chance that a rising sense of alarm among members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) triggered by pirate attacks on 
shipping heading for or departing the Arabian Gulf might presage a 
change of attitudes in the wider region. Among international 
institutions, the UN, the EU, and NATO have engaged in pirate 
suppression with varying degrees of effectiveness and understanding. 
The insurance industry raised rates for shipping in the Gulf of Aden, 
but this did not have the effect it had in Southeast Asia with 
governments that were sensitive to increases in business costs and to 
the impression that they were unable to control their own territory.  
One final diplomatic effort need to be mentioned: the Somali 
contact group on counter-piracy, also known as the Kampala Process. 
This was established in January 2010 in response to a request by 
Working Group 1 of the CGPCS for a venue where counter-piracy 
information generation and sharing discussions and negotiations could 
take place between the TFG, Puntland, and Somaliland, and where their 
counter-piracy efforts could be coordinated. The United Nations 





provides secretariat functions to support the drafting of new anti-piracy 




D. Three Representative Incidents 
The examples of the Bonsella, the Golden Nori, and the Le 
Ponant exemplify these difficulties and strained allegiances. 
 
 
Map 3: Somalian Piracy Threat Map, 2005-2010 
 
Bonsella: A Pirate Attack in the 1990s 
On September 9, 1994, the M.V. Bonsella, a small merchant 
ship carrying emergency aid to Somalia, was approached by a dhow 
three miles off Caluula, northeast Somalia, on the Gulf of Aden. Once 
it was alongside, armed men were seen on deck. Two mortar shells 
were fired, a red flag was waved, and the ship ordered to heave-to or it 
would be sunk. Eleven men from the 26 onboard the dhow boarded the 
vessel and identified themselves as the Somali Coast Guard, North East 
Region. After examining the cargo manifest, they told the master that 
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the Bonsella would be used to apprehend fishing vessels operating off 
the Somali coast without proper licenses. On September 10, the vessel, 
still accompanied by the dhow, approached two suspected fishing 
vessels, both of which turned out to be merchant ships. One was 
pursued and ordered to stop via VHF radio messages. Instead it 
increased speed and headed out to sea, despite two mortar shells being 
fired in its direction. When the “coast guards” were asked why a ship 
that was obviously not a fishing boat had been fired upon, the hijackers 
explained that “they wanted to capture a faster vessel for their 
patrolling operations” and promised to release the Bonsella once they 
captured a ship that better met their needs. They ordered the master to 
prepare the vessel’s Zodiac for future use during pursuit operations. 
After moving past Cape Guardafui on September 12, the ship and dhow 
headed for the open sea the next day, where they drifted while awaiting 
passing vessels. 
Late in the afternoon on the 13th, they chased a ship using the 
dhow and the Zodiac but were unable to catch it. The master was 
advised that his vessel and crew would be released the following day. 
That day, September 14, the captors demanded that the ship’s cargo of 
aid supplies as well as almost all of its stores and equipment be 
discharged into the dhow before they would release the ship, and 
threatened that if the crew resisted, they would be shot and the ship 
sunk. By 1300 hours the transfer was complete. The “coast guards” 
then demanded the ship’s cash, claiming they needed the money to pay 
the stevedores at Boosaaso. The captain attempted to bluff it out but 
was marched to the ship’s safe and made to open it at gunpoint. The 
hijackers then returned to their dhow and ordered the master to sail for 
Djibouti. Although the crew had been escorted everywhere at gunpoint 
throughout their ordeal, fortunately none were injured. 
Although this attack—along with others such as that on the 
MV Full City in 1995, in which currency and alcohol were stolen—
share strong similarities with pirate attacks the world over, many of the 
features that now distinguish Somali piracy from that which occurs 
elsewhere were also evident, such as the use of “mother ships,” the 





ships, the distance from shore, and the involvement of corrupt political 
figures. Experience from other pirate-prone areas around the world 
strongly indicates that many, if not most, pirate incidents go 
unreported. The level of organization displayed by this attack suggests 
that the pirates were too well-practiced for it to have been anything 
other than part of a pattern. 
 
Golden Nori: Fears About Terrorism  
In October 2007, the Panamanian-flagged, Japanese-owned 
11,600 DWT chemical tanker Golden Nori, loaded in part with 
benzene, was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden about 70 nm off the Somali 
town of Caluula.
83
 This was one of the first recent hijackings in the 
Gulf; most previous major ship attacks had taken place off the Indian 
Ocean coast. The USS Porter responded to the ship’s distress signal 
and succeeded in sinking the pirates’ skiffs, which were being towed 
behind the tanker. With assistance from a German naval vessel, the 
Porter prevented it from entering the port of Boossaso, but they could 
not prevent the tanker being sailed to a point 380nm (704km) further 
south, where it was then moored. Because benzene is particularly 
volatile, fears were expressed that the hijacking was either terrorist-
inspired or that the ship might fall into terrorist hands and be used as a 
floating bomb to attack a major port. The U.S. Navy received 
permission to enter Somali territorial waters to keep the Golden Nori 
under close observation. Senior naval commanders took the view that 
the permission granted could serve as a useful precedent in the future, 
whether the attack was terrorist-inspired or not. The dock landing ship 
USS Whidbey Island remained on station until the ship and its crew 
was released in December, shortly after the pirates issued a demand for 
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a $1 million ransom and the US Navy began to block supplies, 




Le Ponant: An SOF Raid, a UNSC Resolution, and an Attempted 
Prosecution 
In April 2008, the Le Ponant, an 850-ton, three-masted French 
luxury sail cruise ship that was relocating from the Seychelles to the 
Mediterranean for the summer cruising season with 30 crew but no 
passengers on board, was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, triggering the 
most robust counter-piracy response up to that point.
85
  
The captain, Patrick Marchesseau, had set his course based on 
naval advice and was following a track designed to take his ship down 
the midline of the Gulf, about 100nm from both the Yemeni and 
Somali coastlines. The ship was proceeding at its maximum economic 
speed of 13kts. Pirates sensibly go to where the ships, are which is 
where the navies and maritime safety organizations tell them they 
should be. Ships first were told they should stay 50nm off the coast of 
the Indian Ocean, so the pirates waited at the 50nm line; then they were 
told to keep 100nm off the coast, so the pirates followed them there, 
and so on. Some ships now hug the coast of India, which is where the 
pirates are operating as well. Waiting for Le Ponant, therefore, was a 
hijacked long-line fishing boat, sitting silent and stationary right where 
it knew its potential victims would be sailing. Marchesseau was 
sufficiently suspicious of the vessel to give it a wide berth, however. 
He relaxed once it passed astern, only to be told that two skiffs carrying 
a total of nine pirates were approaching them at speed. The pirates were 
clearly experienced. They ignored the temptation to board the Le 
Ponant using the yacht’s low marina deck at the stern. If they had done 
so, they would have become entangled in the ropes the yacht was 
trailing precisely for this purpose. The pirates instead took up positions 
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either side of the yacht’s mid-point. This meant that when it tried to 
zigzag, they were sitting at the points where the maneuver had the least 
effect. They then approached the yacht and hooked a ladder over the 
side. When crewmembers attempted to dislodge the ladders, the pirates 
opened fire with AK-47s.  
Once on board, the pirate’s leader, Ahmed, ordered 
Marchesseau to make for Cape Guardafui, and tracked the fidelity of 
the ship’s progress using a hand-held GPS receiver. Proceeding as 
slowly as he dared, Marchesseau and his crew watched as the yacht was 
intercepted by a Canadian frigate, the HMCS Charlottetown. It 
launched its helicopter to look them over, but made no attempt to 
intervene. The pirates were blithely unconcerned by its presence and 
were equally unperturbed when it was joined and then overtaken by a 
French corvette, the Commandant Bouan, which tracked the yacht as it 
was sailed south along the Somali coast for another two days. If 
anything, the pirates were more concerned about being pirated 
themselves and shot at any small craft that approached too close. They 
stopped once to pick up food and reinforcements. The food came in the 
form of live goats that the pirates slaughtered, bled, butchered, and 
cooked on deck as they needed them.  
Their destination was the town of Gara’ad, a line of tin roofs 
hugging the coast south of Eyl in Puntland. The yacht was anchored 
about a mile off the town. Out to sea, the corvette was joined by a 
French frigate and, over the horizon, by a helicopter carrier. The 
helicopter carrier’s presence could not have been a secret, as fishing 
vessels passed by it every day.  
The Le Ponant was greeted upon arrival by about 70 townsfolk, 
some 30 of whom were paid about $50 a day to help the pirates guard 
their prize while they took turns to go ashore. It emerged subsequently 
that this group was loosely affiliated with the group that hijacked the 
Faina some months later. Senior figures also came on board, one of 
whom was described as the “chairman” and another who acted as a 
translator. A conference was convened at which it was decided to ask 





During the time he and his crew were held, Captain 
Marchesseau was told that the pirates were subject to fines for breaches 
of discipline: $100 for late return from shore leave; $500 for 
discharging a weapon; $1,000 for sleeping on watch; $2,000 for 
harming a hostage. American journalist William Langewiesche 
suggests that reports issued after the hostages were released inflated the 
importance of this list into a pirate code or charter, and comments that 
“the penalties described, if remotely accurate, were probably poorly 
enforced.”
86
 Yet the crew’s actual experience suggests that the pirates 
did respond to discipline: one man who accidentally discharged his 
weapon was immediately sent ashore and, when Marchesseau objected 
to the theft of the crew’s possessions, those who took them were 
reprimanded and the items returned. Langewiesche adds without further 
explanation that in some cases this was only temporary. 
The negotiations were conducted with the owners via the 
yacht’s satellite phone. An initial counteroffer of $1.3 million was 
rejected. After several days of haggling, $2.15 million was agreed on, 
to be delivered directly to the pirates on board. This was one of the first 
times the pirates had made such a demand, and the air-drop methods 
that would later be developed were not yet in place. Instead, the money 
was sent to the French frigate, which launched two Zodiacs to a point 
some distance away from where the yacht was anchored. The pirates’ 
negotiating team approached the Zodiacs in skiffs. Three bags of 
money were handed across, and the pirates counted it out in their boat 
in sight of the French naval and gendarmerie team. When they were 
satisfied, the pirate negotiators headed for the beach. The hostages, 
minus Marchesseau, were allowed to board the Zodiacs, which took 
them to the frigate. The captain’s three guards were collected by a skiff, 
which also headed for Gara’ad. Marchesseau was left alone exactly 
seven days after the pirates had first come aboard. A French SOF team 
then arrived and evacuated him to the frigate. 
Shortly afterwards, a report reached the task group that a SUV 
was leaving the town. Helicopters were scrambled with SOF on board. 
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The SUV was spotted, and its engine block shot out. Six men were 
captured, and $200,000 of the ransom recovered. When the captives 
were paraded before Marchesseau, however, he only recognized three 
of them. The governor of the Mudug stated subsequently that only two 
of the captives were pirates; the remaining four were khat dealers 
unconnected with the events on board. The yacht’s crew was taken to 
Djibouti and flown to France, where President Sarkozy himself greeted 
them, deeming their return a great triumph. The captives were also sent 
to France, where the authorities stated on several occasions that they 
would be tried. So far, there has been no record of any trial taking 
place, and what happened to these men is unclear. It is possible that 
were returned to Puntland, where they may have been imprisoned.  
As a consequence of the Le Ponant incident, the French 
government made it clear that it would take a leading role in finding an 
international solution to Somali piracy and annouced shortly afterwards 
that it was working with the US and the UK on a joint resolution to be 
put before the UN Security Council. This was adopted by the Council 
in June 2008 as UNSC Resolution 1816.
87
 Interestingly, the French 
operated a carrier group in the northern Arabian Sea in 2006 that 
mounted air operations over Afghanistan, but they were unwilling to 
place it under CTF-150 and therefore the group remained under 
national control at all times. 
 
IV. Strategies and Counterstrategies 
 
History does not provide statesmen or officials with a template 
for action, but experience suggests that once the necessary political will 
has been aroused, any counter-piracy strategy needs to confront three 
issues: 
 How to conduct operations on land 
 How to deny pirates access to capital, labor, and markets 
 How to transform pirate activity using legal and economic 
incentives 
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1. What are the pirates’ weaknesses, strategically and tactically? 
How can these weaknesses be exploited? 
2. What would be the effect of specific international regulations 
clarifying piracy and the international community’s reaction to it?  
3. Pirates are considered both criminals and military enemies, 
giving them an ambiguous status: they posses the rights and 
protections of both groups. What is a workable solution to this? 
4. How can anti-piracy success be measured? Harsher penalties 
for pirates has led to harsher treatment of their victims. Are 
civilian casulties justified in order to stop piracy? 
5. What are key ingredients to a successful counter-piracy 
operation? Is CTF-151 useful or necessary? 




A. Conducting Operations on Land 
Piracy is an act of depredation that is executed at sea but 
planned and mounted from the land. Piracy’s weakest link is its need 
for safe harbors and land-based support. Reducing their bases disrupts 
and generally denies pirates the ability to operate. Failure to do so 
prolongs counter-piracy operations and often renders them futile. The 
reason why external force was, and still is, needed to undertake land 
operations is almost always the presence of weak or ineffective 
government ashore.  
U.S. Navy operations against pirates in the West Indies during 
the 1820s clearly demonstrate the limitations placed on the 
effectiveness of a counter-piracy force when it is prevented from 
operating on land against pirate bases, especially if the obstacle is a 
hostile government. Because they were suspicious of American 
motives, Spanish authorities effectively provided the pirates with 
sanctuary. U.S. sailors were not allowed to land on Spanish territory, 





on Cuba or Puerto Rico. Although a combined force of U.S. and Royal 
Navy vessels made life hazardous for the pirates, only when Spain 
recognized it could not hold onto its imperial possessions and local 
officials not only withdrew their support for the pirates’ activities but 
also began to cooperate actively in piracy suppression did the outbreak 




B. Denying Access to Capital, Labor, and Markets  
Piracy can be brought under control more quickly if the 
economic opportunity that drives it is reduced or if the cost of 
exploiting that opportunity is raised to the point where the reward 
ceases to justify the risk. The inability to affect the economic factors 
driving Somali piracy has been observable from its inception. 
Taking action to deny pirates sanctuary in Somalia would alter 
their risk-reward calculations dramatically because it would divert 
more of their income into self-protection. Sanctuary is important to the 
Somali business model: it enables hostages to be held and kept alive 
cheaply. Kidnap and ransom was less successful around the Strait of 
Malacca between roughly 2000 and 2005 because pirate negotiators 
could not use time to their advantage and captives had to be moved 
regularly to avoid discovery. Whatever their business model, all pirates 
depend on markets where they can purchase the supplies and 
equipment they need, hire the labor they require, and sell whatever they 
plunder. Disrupting any one of these can affect pirate operations 
adversely; disrupting all of them prevents marauders from operating.  
Breaking the labor portion of this economic cycle requires 
political and economic change within Somalia that will take time to be 
effective. The focus has been on closing down the demand market 
where hostages are turned into cash or cutting off the supply of 
seafarers. The suggestion that demand can be extinguished by making 
the payment of ransom illegal is callous; ransom is currently the only 
way that hostages can regain their freedom. Those who advance this 
argument do so knowing full well that a pool of seafarers will be 
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trapped in Somalia but argue that the long-term gain of piracy 
eradication outweighs the short-term misery and potential loss of life, 
even though it may take two years or more for the policy to bite. 
Further, only a few hundred sailors would be affected, most of who 
come from developing countries. It seems hard to believe that such 
calculated inhumanity would not have a depressive effect on the 
willingness of all sailors to embark on Indian Ocean voyages, and this 
might well spark a union labor embargo.  
Using naval power to cut off the supply of seafarers is hugely 
inefficient. In the absence of effective action on land or from the sea, 
ship owners will have to invest more in self-protection, including 
armed protective details where necessary.
89
 These are expensive, and if 
all ships crossing the western Indian Ocean have to embark such 
detachments, the cost of goods shipped by sea would necessarily 
increase. That said, so far no ship passing Somalia with such a detail on 
board has been hijacked or even attacked.  
Ship self-protection measures range from the most basic, such 
as standing adequate watches, maintaining maximum sustainable speed 
throughout the transit, and securing all external doors, to the use of 
powerful lights, high-pressures hoses to throw a curtain of water over 
the ships’ sides, trailing ropes off the stern to prevent pirates gaining 
access to what is often the lowest part of the ship, possibly fixing 
booms to each side and trailing ropes in the water beside ships to 
prevent lateral approaches, using anti-climb paint, and wrapping rails 
with razor wire, which can be electrified for additional protection. The 
use of private security guards, especially if they are armed, remains a 
contentious issue. Nonetheless, it is a market into which the world’s 
leading private security companies have plunged with alacrity, 
providing services from risk assessment and security advice to hostage 
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negotiation and armed personnel, at rates that already exceed the 
amount pirates have extracted in ransom. 
Although this represents a reversal of an economic trend 
reaching back to the 18th century, as noted above, this development is 
being pressed remorselessly by the international community, which 
prefers to see industry bear the cost of piracy suppression.
90
 It is likely 
to be ineffective since the pirates retain the escalatory initiative. This 
was demonstrated in late 2010, when pirates began using hostages as 
human shields to deter naval forces from intervening and, in some 
cases, harming their captives once ashore to force the early payment of 
ransom.
91
 These odious developments unfortunately represent a rational 
response to a situation where the pirates find themselves the subject of 
more aggressive naval tactics at sea, thus reducing the number of 
successful hijackings, while at the same time their bases on land are left 
untouched, thus leaving their sense of immunity intact. The 
combination is almost an incentive to maximize their returns. It seems 
likely that the rising cost of protection, coupled to the steady erosion of 
the effectiveness of that protection as the pirates adapt, will increase 
pressure on states from ship owners and labor unions to uphold their 





C. How to Achieve Pirate Transformation 
Even today, combatants can be divided into two categories: 
lawful and unlawful. Although modern pirates are treated as criminals, 
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their predecessors were often regarded as combatants who fell for the 
most part into the “unlawful” category. The famous Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius (1586-1645) argued that pirates could undergo a legal 
“mutation,” moving from the unlawful to the lawful categories. He 
wrote: “A transformation [mutatio] may take place, not merely in the 
case of individuals … but also in the case of groups, so that they who 
have only been robbers upon embracing another mode of life becomes 
a state” capable of providing for “the enjoyment of rights.”
93
 
Effecting such a change inevitably means offering pardons and 
other inducements. This may be repugnant, but it follows ineluctably 
from piracy’s ambiguous status between the criminal and the political, 
the cost and difficulty of prosecuting pirates under domestic law, and 
the logistical, technical, and financial demands of suppressing an 
activity that exploits the fluid medium of the sea. Although Rome and 
Britain laid the foundation of all international and national law against 
piracy today, they both recognized that major outbreaks needed to be 
addressed flexibly, selectively offering the perpetrators pardon and, in 
some cases, economic and political incentives to change, as well as 
punishment and destruction if they did not.  
This is not to suggest that amnesty can be made to work easily; 
the historical record shows that is not the case. Application of this 
experience to Somalia would be complicated by the fact that before 
amnesty could be offered to the pirates and their organizers, it would 
need to be extended to members of the political leadership and 
officialdom in Puntland who benefit from and in many cases are 
intimately involved in piracy operations. Development assistance 
would also need to be in the mix. Amnesty and development would 
need to be backed with penalties. While most of these would involve 
the withdrawal of political or economic support, others would need to 
be directed at individuals, including the cancellation of amnesty, 
restrictions on travel, and the freezing of bank accounts and other assets 
held overseas. If history is a reliable guide, the threat of punitive action 
against pirate bases would also need to be in the mix. Naval patrols 
                                                          
93
 Cited in Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of 





would need to continue, although better intelligence would make them 
more productive, and a local coast guard with coordinated land- and 
sea-based components would need to be raised as part of a coherent 






Appendix A: An Overview of the Key Social, 
Cultural, Economic, and Political Issues Shaping 
Somalia Today 
 
The following section provides a short background and 
explanation of key components of contemporary Somali history. It sets 
the stage for comprehending and analyzing the rest of the case study.  
 
 






A. Somalia, 1960-1991 
In 1960 Britain and Italy granted independence to the two 
territories they separately controlled in the Horn of Africa. These 
territories merged almost immediately to form the Republic of Somalia. 
In 1969, following the assassination of the Republic’s first president, 
the army under the command of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre 
seized control. Barre was appointed president shortly thereafter and a 
year later announced that scientific socialism would become the 
country’s official ideology.
94
 The strength of his commitment was 
always questionable as, like most colonial rulers, he was prepared to 
accept aid from wherever he could get it; in fact Somalia depended 
upon it. 
The USSR was Barre’s sponsor until 1977, when it switched its 
support from Somalia to the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia, 
Somalia’s traditional enemy, led by Colonel Mengistu. In response, 
Barre invaded the Ogaden region, an area that had been absorbed into 
Ethiopia during its imperial wars of the 19th century but whose 
population remained ethnically Somali. Barre’s aim was to secure his 
regime’s domestic support by tapping into pan-Somali sentiment. He 
was hoping to secure his objectives before the Soviets could come to 




This defeat left Barre’s regime seriously weakened internally 
and dependent more than ever on foreign aid from Arab countries and 
especially the United States. Although he was no longer able to count 
on internal unity and allegiance, the aid enabled Barre to expand the 
army from around the 12,000 possible under Soviet largesse to 120,000 
men under U.S. patronage; the disadvantage of this was that the sheer 
size of the armed forces limited the funds available to manipulate 
important social groups and exploit the divisions between them. This 
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limitation forced Barre to make choices, and he chose to favor his 
southern power base at the expense of the northern clans living in what 
are now Somaliland and Puntland.
96
 As a consequence, the first armed 
resistance to his rule arose in the north in 1978, focused on a clan-based 
political grouping called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) led by a one-time associate, Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed of 
the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood clan-family. Barre’s response 
was to arm the other Darood sub-clans and stir up inter-communal 
rivalry. 
The SSDF was the first of the modern-sounding political 
groups based on traditional sub-clans that arose to challenge Barre. 
This in turn provoked him into arming their traditional rivals to deflect 
the violence that might otherwise have been directed against his 
regime. The Majerteen resistance in the north-east was followed in 
1981 by the Isaaq in the north-west. Barre’s bitter response to these 
challenges lead to the 1988-91 civil war. His poisonous policy of 
playing one sub-clan off against another backfired as the army fell apart 
into clan-based militias. By January 1991, the game was up. Barre at 
first fled south to the port of Kismayo and then abroad to Nigeria, 
where he died in 1995. 
 
B. The Reasons for Regime Failure 
The United States abandoned Barre at the end of the Cold War. 
Like the rulers of other ex-colonial states with only a rudimentary 
government capacity that depended on superpower payments to 
survive, he lost whatever authority and legitimacy he had been able to 
buy.
97
 Barre, like the continent’s other discarded rulers, scrambled to 
secure new sources of income to sustain the patronage system that had 
kept him in power. In common with most other cases where the ruler’s 
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authority was too weak to contain disruptive actions, the response by 
powerful individuals or sub-groups in Somalia was to concentrate on 
wealth accumulation rather than strengthening state institutions.  
Rent extraction is payments over and above the real cost of 
goods. It was conducted not by the rulers directly but by groups or 
individuals who allied themselves to the ruler in return for economic 
favors. This exchange of goods and services for government money 
was scarcely more than state-sponsored criminality. Some rulers played 
this role with conspicuous success, such as Mobuto Sese Seko in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although Barre had proved skilled 
at attracting international aid and manipulating its proceeds for internal 
political advantage, he proved less adept at extracting rents 
domestically for the same purpose. His campaign of divide-and-rule 
was insufficiently effective to save his regime, but all too effective at 
sowing lasting discord between the clans and sub-clans. In the process 
he taught his successors how to seize the assets they wanted and sustain 
militias through predation. Access to political patronage became more 
important than the efficient use of those assets, a trend that was 
exacerbated by a 1975 tenancy law making it easier for bureaucrats to 
expropriate village lands. The law disrupted the customary pattern of 
land holding in the south, drawing in outsiders who drove the conflict 
that exploded in the 1990s. The outsiders depended initially on the 
coercive power of the Barre regime but, as this faltered, political 
figures who were often Barre protégés began to field their own armed 
gangs. As the regime’s power declined further, these gangs were able to 
break the law with impunity and Somalia began its descent into 
political and security chaos. 
It is important to understand that discord and disorder did not 
affect every part of Somalia equally and that civic and economic 
activity continued successfully (in some cases extremely successfully) 
in the absence of central government. Nonetheless, it is also the case 
that some groups viewed the state’s collapse not as a crisis but as an 
opportunity to make money and acquire prestige by using means that in 
more peaceful circumstances would have been impossible and that 





pillage, protection, control of vital trades such as livestock and charcoal 
exports, administration of trade-related economic activities such as 
ports and airports, taxing of markets, exploitation of arms and migrant 
flows, and the expropriation of land. Weaker groups were starved and 
denied foreign aid to increase their political amenability.  
This rent-seeking behavior is apparent in pirate activity in two 
ways. First, it is at least arguable that some of the initial assaults on 
international fishing vessels were perpetrated “bottom-up” by local 
fishermen fighting to retain control over the rich fishing grounds off 
Somalia that were now unprotected.
98
 From a very early stage, 
however, their actions were countered by domestic warlord groups 
intent on making money from the international fleets through the sale 
of licenses.
99
 This evolution was epitomized in the case of Puntland by 
its eventual alliance with Hassan Munya, who after absconding to 
Yemen with a Barre financed fishing fleet in 1991 used it to prey 
parasitically on local fishermen, forcing them to sell their catch to him 
at rock-bottom prices.
100
 Second, this warlord activity was in line with 






1. What is meant when a state is described as “failed”? What are 
the implications for security? 
2. Is the term “failed state” an oversimplification? Has it led to 
lazy thinking? 
3. Like many ex-colonial states in Africa, Somalia was dependent 
on foreign aid from the moment it was granted independence in 
1960. What have been the political and economic consequences of 
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that dependence for Somalia, for neighboring states, and for the 
international community? 
4. What should a “state” look like? What role do states play? 
What happens when a state is weak, is failing, or has failed? 
 
C. Somalia Since the Fall of Barre 
Clans 
Reaching any understanding of Somali piracy or, indeed, any 
understanding of Somali society and politics generally, demands the 
recognition that Somalia is a lineage-based society where almost 
everyone is identified by his or her membership in a clan. Clans are the 
principal source of individual and family security. Appreciation of 
political relations requires an understanding of genealogical 
relationships, although these do not determine enmity or goodwill, 
merely context. There are six major clan confederations: the Hawiye, 
Darood, Isaaq, and Dir, which are all traditionally pastoralists surviving 
on animal herding alone; and the Rahanweyn and Dirgil, which are 
largely agro-pastoralist, combining herding with arable farming, and 
consequently have a lower social status. The clans form what 
anthropologists term segmentary systems, which can best be visualized 
as nesting Russian dolls fitting inside each other; such systems are 
decentralized, highly individualistic, and democratic. Clan and sub-
clans are led by “elders,’ but these individuals, generally senior, adult 
males, have little instated authority and are not synonymous with 
chiefs.  
Experience in the years following independence demonstrated 
that clan loyalty was often incompatible with bureaucratic government. 
After Barre’s fall, the workings of government withered in the turmoil 
of clan-based conflict. While people may turn to them in times of 
violence and danger, it is important to note that clans only mobilize as 
groups when conflict beckons. Clan boundaries are not, therefore, 
barriers. Cooperation between individual members of different clans 
and even between clan or sub-clan groupings is not merely possible but 
commonplace. The Marehan (a sub-clan of the Darood) and the Haber 





in 2001 to control the lucrative traffic through the port of Kismayo. The 
freedom to cooperate across clan lines was also a crucial factor in 
Somali piracy: the “Somali Marines,” the highly organized group that 
started operating from Haradheere in 2005, was based on an alliance 
between elements within the Majerteen (Darood) and Suliman 
(Hawiye) sub-clans. 
It is important to emphasize that not everything in Somalia has 
to happen within a person’s own clan. Cooperation across clans lines is 
perfectly possible and occurs in many walks of life, commercial 
activity being a good example. Islamic political movements have also 
recruited support from multiple clan sources. The leadership of the 
violent Islamist movement al-Shabaab is drawn from a number of 
clans, although recently senior leadership positions have generally been 
held by members of Isaaq sub-clans. Piracy was based on an intial 
alliance, but recruits have also been drawn from outside this original 
core. Some educated Somalis living abroad even suggest that they 
consciously avoid asking each other lineage questions simply because 
the experience of the past twenty years has demonstrated just how 




1. What are clans? How are they different from tribes? In what 
ways should this difference shape the policy responses of external 
actors? 
2. Does cultural understanding matter? If so, how can policy-
relevant information be gathered and taught effectively? 
 
Warlords 
Following Barre’s departure in 1991, much of the political 
space was occupied by warlords. Kimberley Marten identifies such 
figures as leaders (1) who use trained men to take advantage of the 
disintegration of central authority to seize control over often small 
geographical areas; (2) whose actions are based on self-interest, not 





patronage ties to their followers; and (4) who erect barriers to trade 
between the area they control and neighboring warlord-controlled areas 
as a result of the fragmentation of political and economic structures.
102
 
Somalian examples include General Muhammad Farrah Aided (Haber 
Gedir Ayr sub-clan); his competitor for control of Mogadishu, Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed (Abgaal sub-clan); General Said Hersi Morgan 
(Majerteen clan, Abdirahim sub-clan) in Kismayo; and Colonel 
Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed (Majerteen clan) in Puntland.  
 
Warlords’ Contribution to the Rise of Piracy 
Warlords appear to have contributed to the rise of piracy as a 
consequence of their interest in the commercial potential of fishing and 
their complicity in toxic waste dumping off the coast. They followed 
the model established by their mentor Barre, whose government issued 
fishing licenses to foreign vessels in a somewhat unsystematic manner. 
Once he had gone, the warlords and the political groups they controlled 
began to issue licenses in their turn, including Yusuf’s Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front. The UN reported that the sale of such 
licenses “had acquired the features of a large-scale ‘protection’ racket, 
indistinguishable in most cases from piracy” off Somalia’s northeastern 
coast, which became Puntland, and that the resulting conflict between 
fishing vessels sometimes resembled “naval warfare.”
103
  
Warlord groups in the south began to copy this practice, even 
establishing a London-based operation to “license’ foreign fishing 
vessels in part of Somalia’s self-declared exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). This extends from the Kenyan border to about nine degrees 
north, roughly coinciding with Puntland’s southern border.
104
 The 
company, Africa Fisheries Management (Afnet), channeled the profits 
into an account controlled by Hussein Ali Ahmed, who divided it up 
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between five other warlords: Hussein Aideed, Ali Mahdi, Abdullahi 
Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir, and General Morgan. The revenue generated 
from licenses amounted to $600,000 to $1 million per year from 1996 
to 1998 but had dwindled to around $300,000 a year by 2002.
105
 The 
Transitional Federal Government benefited from a similar scheme, 
issuing its own licenses after it was established in 2004. 
In 1999, Yusuf’s government signed a deal with Hart Nimrod, 
a British company registered in Bermuda, to establish a maritime 
security force to police Puntland’s claimed EEZ and force foreign 
vessels to purchase fishing licenses. The force was under-resourced 
from the start; the ship it commissioned to conduct patrols was too slow 
to catch any but the slowest license evader. Consequently the venture 
made little money and was wound up after it was caught in the internal 
battle between Yusuf and his political rivals in 2001. Unfortunately, its 
80 or so coast guards, whose training presumably included boat 
handling, navigation and vessel boarding, included some who put that 
knowledge to subsequent use in piracy.
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Hazardous waste dumping has also been cited as a piracy 
cause. It is an emotional issue, and repeated accusations have been 
made concerning links between some members of the Somali elite and 
Italian and Swiss companies that allegedly were front operations for the 
Italian mafia. Two reports of waste washing up on land, including low-
level nuclear waste, circulated in 1992 and 1996 but nothing more was 
heard about it until 2004. At that time, following the Indian Ocean 
tsunami, more barrels of toxic material were reportedly cast up on 
sections of the Somali coastline. Several of these reports originated 
from Greenpeace, which summarized their investigations and 
interpretations of what had occurred in a 2010 report entitled “Toxic 
Ships’. Although they were unable to prove their accusations 
conclusively, they asserted that “waste was likely dumped in Somalia 
in the period 1990-1997,” probably with the active connivance of 
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The Battle for Mogadishu 
More destructively, the battle between Aideed and Ali Mahdi 
for control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, plumbed the depths of 
savagery and set the pattern of unrestrained violence that continues to 
scar what had been a flourishing and cosmopolitan city under Italian 
rule. Although both Hawiye, they came from different sub-clans. 
Aideed had been the Somali ambassador to India under Barre and in 
1988 was chosen by the Haber Gedir Ayr sub-clan to lead their military 
force; Ali Mahdi had risen to prominence through his close connections 
to Barre, not as a consequence of any public support. However, he had 
the means to equip fighters. In 1990 when Aideed left the city to pursue 
Barre southward,Mahdi stayed behind and used his wealth to engineer 
his election as interim president. But Aideed proved to be the more 
effective and ruthless commander. The Haber Gedir Ayr, unlike Ali 
Mahdi’s Abgaal clan, had no previous presence in Mogadishu. Aideed 
changed that by recruiting young fighters from the sub-clan area in the 
interior by promising them loot and women. Cut adrift from their 
families and the sanctions maintained by clan elders, Aideed’s forces 
fought with a murderous ferocity that their opponents could not match. 
It is estimated that within nine months of Barre’s departure around 
35,000 non-combatant Mogadishu residents lost their lives as the two 
factions struggled for control. Aideed effectively won because he 
forced Ali Mahdi to accept the division of the city between them. 
To consolidate his position and fulfill his promise to his 
fighters, Aideed cut off food and medical supplies to the refugee camps 
in the areas he controlled, preventing the original inhabitants from 
returning and reclaiming their looted homes and possessions. This 
provoked international outrage. In 1992 the UN negotiated a ceasefire 
                                                          
107
 “The Toxic Ships: The Italian Hub, the Mediterranean Area and Africa,” A 
Greenpeace Report, June 2010, p. 25. See also Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: 






and introduced a military mission, United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM). Both Aideed and Ali Mahdi recognized the 
political leverage that control of aid shipments would give them. They 
vied for the right to supervise aid distribution and attacked the UN 
when their demands were ignored. Once it was clear that the UN 
humanitarian mission had largely failed, the US reluctantly agreed to 
intervene to protect supplies. The force that arrived with great fanfare 
in Mogadishu in December 1992 was named optimistically “Restore 




Aideed and the Haber Gedir Ayr were suspicious of the US 
presence but hostile to the UN, particularly to its then Secretary-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who they saw as their enemy. The 
precise trigger for the calamitous events recounted in Mark Bowden’s 
book Black Hawk Down remains open to interpretation.
109
 Some 
observers suggest that Aideed, looking to pick a fight with the UN 
force, mounted a pre-meditated ambush on an isolated group of 
Pakistani soldiers who were killed and then disemboweled to maximize 
the terror effect of the attack. Others suggest that although Aideed felt 
under pressure as a consequence of the international intervention, his 
position was much stronger than that of his domestic rivals. They could 
only change this relative balance by arguing in support of the power-
sharing arrangement being advanced by the UN that offered them a 
way of wresting power from Aideed, something that they could not 
achieve on their own.  
 Advocates of this view suggest that the crisis would probably 
not have taken the course that it did if the hugely experienced U.S. 
diplomat Robin Oakley had not been withdrawn, thus removing a brake 
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on the confrontational UNITAF commander, Admiral Howe, who was 
accustomed to getting his own way and had the political connections in 
Washington to make that happen. There is no dispute that Aideed was a 
ruthless leader with little concern for human life, either Somali or 
foreign, but Howe was ill-suited to the fluid negotiation-based culture 
of the Somalis. He was enraged by Aideed’s sense of his sub-clan’s 
entitlement to power and deployed his forces without concern for the 
messages these deployments sent. One of the most sensitive sites in the 
city was the radio station, which Aideed controlled. In this 
interpretation, Aideed, who had only been informed of UNITAF’s 
decision to inspect the radio station the night before, saw the move, 
which was assigned to a lightly armed Pakistani force, as proof that the 
UN were taking sides in the conflict starting with an attempt to silence 
his most influential propaganda tool. He reacted quickly, seeding the 
crowd that gathered to watch and protest the Pakistanis’ activities with 
gunmen who shot from inside the crowd, leaving 25 soldiers dead and 
over 50 injured.  
Howe’s response was to order an attack on the Adbi House 
where Aideed and the clan elders met regularly. The meeting of July 
12, 1993, was called to criticize Aideed and question his methods. 
Missiles fired from US helicopters left 73 dead and hundreds wounded; 
Aideed was not among them. The surprise attack outraged Somalis, 
bolstered Aideed’s status, and undermined the UN’s claim that its 
mission was entirely humanitarian.  
Howe continued to press for Aideed’s arrest and in the 
aftermath of the Abdi House debacle demanded that SOF be deployed 
to help him achieve that aim. On October 3, in an ill-fated attempt to 
capture Aideed and his inner circle, two US helicopters were destroyed, 
18 US servicemen killed, and 73 wounded. The Clinton administration 
decided almost immediately that the US should withdraw: all US troops 
left by March 1994 and the final UN contingent left in March 1995. Its 
departure was marked by mass looting by Somalis.
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Evidence emerged later that al Qaeda had been in contact with 
Aideed who took support where he could get it, although he was firmly 
opposed to Islamism. The US helicopters were brought down using 
fragmentation RPG rounds detonated close to the tail rotors, which 
mimiced a tactic that al Qaeda had honed during the war against Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan.
111
 Despite its own subsequent claims there is, 
however, little evidence to suggest that al Qaeda’s actual participation 





1. Why did the United States intervene in Somalia in 1993? What 
changed during the course of the deployment to provoke Farah 
Aideed?  
2. Upon closer investigation, was it the UN and the US that 
provoked Aideed? 
 
What Explains the Difference Between North and South? 
The conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi epitomized 
Barre’s poisonous legacy that exploited, but did not create, the natural 
divisions within Somali society. At first glance the existence of these 
divisions is surprising. Somalia, unlike many post-colonial states in 
Africa, is one of the largest ethnically, religiously, and linguistically 
homogenous areas on the continent. The primary fault line lies between 
the pastoralist north and the agro-pastoralist south. The two clan 
confederations in the south, the Dirgil and Rahanweyn (known 
collectively as the Sab), are the most open social groups and should, 
theoretically, provide a basis for Somali nationalism. Even with this 
advantage, however, they have never succeeded in overcoming the 
northern clans’ genealogical pride and scorn for settled farmers. The 
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long history of pastoralism, and the attitudes of its practitioners born of 
years of migration and the hard living it entails, have proved a poor 
grounding for the institutions of modern government – certainly one 
centralized in Mogadishu – to the point where it might be more 
accurate to describe Somalia as a “geographical expression” or 
“cultural entity” than as a nation.  
Two plausible explanations have been advanced for the 
continuation of these differences even though both parts of Somalia 
experienced colonial rule and suffered under Barre and his violent 
aftermath. Lewis suggests that the answer lies in the differences 
between Britain’s relatively light-handed colonial rule that left settled 
social structures in today’s Somaliland largely alone, and Italy’s more 
interventionist, centralized, and bureaucratic model.
113
 William Reno, 
in contrast, argues that the vital distinction is the extent to which local 
elites either joined with, or were excluded from, the political networks 
that dominated commerce during the post-colonial period and were 
such a feature under Barre. Political marginalization was more common 
in the north, where groups were “forced to become more adept at 
exploiting the economic opportunities of clandestine markets and 
overseas employment on their own” largely because, lacking political 





Centralism Versus Localism 
UNOSOM ignored this gulf in experience and pursued the 
creation of a centralized state in Somalia to the exclusion of all other 
options. One long-time observer of Somali affairs, Matt Bryden, 
writing in 1999, accused UNOSOM’s political section of trying to 
build this state “around Somalia’s burgeoning warlord class” and 
charged that when the operation withdrew in 1995, it “counted among 
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its achievements the substitution of propaganda for diplomacy, the 
exaltation of the political cult of warlordism, and the destabilization of 
Somalia’s principal reservoirs of political stability: Somaliland and the 




Ironically, it was an official from Ethiopia, a neighbor that 
threatened Somalia and in turn feels threatened by what happens there, 
who came up with a responsive solution to Somalia’s governance 
problem. In the final paragraph of a 1998 paper submitted to the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa 
(IGAD) Partners Forum, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
noted that “local administrative structures could constitute building 
blocks” for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia and that 
“an important role could be played by civil society – the emergence and 
role of which should be encouraged by the international community.”
116
 
As seemingly straightforward and, in Bryden’s words, “banal” 
as such a suggestion sounds, it is one that had eluded the international 
community since Barre’s departure and continues to elude it to the 
present day. It recognized the separate aspirations of Somaliland in the 
northwest, the Rahanweyne fighters in Bay and Bakool in the 
southwest, and the Hiiraan Regional Authority in south-central 
Somalia, and was the spur that led to the creation of Puntland based on 
the Majarteen areas in the northeast. By encouraging these various 
regional embryonic entities with diplomatic attention and foreign aid, 
the “building blocks” approach hoped to build sufficient confidence to 
negotiate the re-establishment of national government. The 
international community led by IGAD supported this approach between 
1998 and 2000, but Ethiopian-Egyptian rivalry effectively scuppered its 
chances.  
The two states had vied for influence in Somalia since the mid-
19th century, and this rivalry flared once again starting in the 1950s. 
The “building blocks” approach was Ethiopian in origin and continued 
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to receive Ethiopian backing. As a result, Egypt endorsed the proposal 
for a Transitional National Government (TNG), with Arab League 
support. In August 2000, the TNG was adopted, despite the fact that the 
majority of states had backed the “building blocks” initiative only a 
year previously.
117
 By endorsing the TNG, the international community 
reverted to its preferred solution, which was the one pushed so 
assiduously by UNOSOM: the re-creation of a single government for 
the whole of Somalia that mimicked normative government models, 
although these models had not been universally successful outside their 
original cultural settings. The ability of centralized government to 
deliver public goods has been especially questionable across much of 
Africa, including Somalia, which by then had become the “poster child’ 
of state failure. 
In fact, between 1991 and 1999, twelve attempts were made to 
reconcile Somalia’s internal factions and build a single government: 
each one failed. Despite its UN mandate, the TNG likewise was a 
failure, never controlling more than a small proportion of Somali 
territory. Its mandate expired in 2003 and was followed in 2004 by 
another UN-mandated body, the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), which controlled even less territory. By the time of its expected 
demise in August 2011, it controlled no more than a few square miles 
of Mogadishu, courtesy of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers operating 
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under an African Union mandate named AMISOM. The fact that UN 
inertia led to the renewal of TFG’s mandate for a further year to August 
2012 in no way changed either the fundamental weakness of the TFG 
or the questionable appropriateness of a central government for all of 
Somalia. The Darood clan had seen the TNG as a creation of the 
Hawiye and worked with Ethiopia to bring it down. The TFG, the first 
president of which was Abdullahi Yusuf, was viewed by the Hawiye as 
working the other way; that is to say, as a Darood conspiracy against 
them. 
It remains the case that a version of the “building blocks” 
approach pursued in the original spirit of localism and without the 
international community’s intent to use it as a means to achieve its 
preferred single-state solution looks to have the best chance of success. 
The two most stable blocks – in fact the only two to have achieved any 
degree of political maturity, although there is a marked difference 
between them – are Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the 
northeast.  
 
Somaliland and Puntland 
Somaliland is a Somali success story—one of the few. It has 
maintained political stability through three peaceful changes of 
government and has created an independent judiciary, an active and 
free press, and a relatively healthy economy. It has nonetheless been 
refused international recognition, which ignores its economic and 
political achievements and flies in the face of both history and sensible 
politics. Ioan Lewis has poured scorn on this ill-found reluctance, 
writing that while governments in Mogadishu have been “recognized 
and disingenuously promoted by the UN; in contrast the functioning 
and democratically elected Somaliland government, that owed virtually 
everything to its own efforts, remained unrecognized. This absurd 
anomaly did nothing to assist southern Somalia’s recovery. However 





subsidiary international peace-makers)…this travesty of reality 
condemned the TNG [and its successors] to a fantasy existence.”
118
 
Puntland was established in 1998 at a conference of Darood 
Harti clan leaders. They issued the Garowe Declaration, which made 
public their intention of forming an administration for the Somalia’s 
northeast. The Declaration was their response to the building blocks 
initiative, which at that stage had some political momentum. The main 
impetus for the move came from Abdullahi Yusuf’s Majarteen sub-
clan, and unsurprisingly he was appointed the region’s first president. 
He refused to step down when his term expired in 2001. With Ethiopian 
backing, he stayed in office until taking up the presidency of the TFG 
in 2004, again with Ethiopian support. Puntland’s political leadership 
has always been associated with corruption of varying sorts and to 
varying degrees. It seems unlikely that virulent piracy could have 
thrived without Yusuf’s tacit approval, at a minimum. Although 
opposed to piracy, his successor, Muse Adde, could do little to resist 
what was already becoming an entrenched interest. Adde’s successor, 
Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, in his turn is variously accused of being 
a either a pirate financier or being in receipt of pirate patronage. 
While the problems of working with Somaliland relate almost 
entirely to diplomatic niceties, the obstacles to working with Puntland 
extend beyond the diplomatic to selecting who, among a number of 
characters of varying integrity, one can work at the “state” level and 
identifying, from a distance, who at the local level either wields 
sufficient power now or could win enough support in the near future to 
make any engagement worthwhile. Although Puntland is largely stable 
and the two most recent changes of government have been peaceful, 
those in power have not displayed the probity and general good sense 
of their Somaliland neighbors. This leaves too much room for 
corruption and criminal behavior to flourish. Although the US 
announced a “dual-track” approach to Somalia’s problems in 2010, 
which despite denials effectively lessened its automatic support for the 
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TFG, there is no evidence so far that the State Department has the 





1. Is the effort to establish a single government for the whole of 
Somalia a workable goal, or a waste of time? Why?  
2. What alternatives are there, and who should be in charge of 
developing and enforcing them? 
 
Puntland’s Piracy Problem 
Piracy is not the sole source of corruption in Puntland, but it is 
a substantial one and buys the gangs much influence. To put it in 
perspective, piracy ransom is probably the quasi-state’s second largest 
source of income – admittedly by some margin—after remittance 
payments from members of the Somali diaspora. Looked at historically, 
this is not of itself enough to rule out some form of engagement. The 
pirates and the men who back them are rational actors quite capable of 
recognizing carrots and sticks. Piracy is a crime. It is also a commercial 
opportunity. Somalis take their opportunities where they can, and 
hijacking is wonderfully profitable; on occasions, incredibly so. Profit 
optimization is possible because of the political protection provided by 
Puntland’s political leadership and access to the territory’s relative 
stability. This has enabled the gangs to organize their activities and 
enjoy their spoils without having to invest prohibitive amounts of 
money and manpower in land-based security.  
On the other hand, pirate organizers are exposed to financial 
risks if the pirates return without a prize, possible political risks in the 
sense that clan interests need to be kept in balance, and, potentially, 
personal risks if their movements and business interests outside 
Puntland can be tracked and targeted. All three – but particularly the 
first and last—offer levers that the U.S. and other states must press if 
piracy is to be contained. However, as the political and naval response 
so far has shown, risk cannot be expanded exponentially; alternative 
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investment opportunities need to be in the mix as well. The concern is 
that if piracy continues to be successful – if the counter-piracy policies 
continue to fall short and the pirates do not begin to fight among 
themselves – then the economic alternatives to piracy within Puntland 





1. What political, economic, and social factors explain why piracy 
finance and management has become concentrated in Puntland? 
2. What evidence is there that illegal fishing and illegal waste 
dumping caused Somali piracy? 
 
The Somali Diaspora 
One source—perhaps the most promising source—of the 
wealth, skills, and entrepreneurship that will be needed to revive 
Somalia and provide alternatives to piracy is the country’s diaspora 
community. Overseas Somalis now constitute the largest African 
community in the UAE, their businesses lining the streets of Dubai’s 
commercial center, while thriving communities can be found 
throughout Western Europe, including the U.K., and North America. 
Significant Somali communities exist in the Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden, while a perhaps surprising number have located 
to Finland. In North America, Toronto and Minneapolis are the main 
centers, although Columbus, OH, Washington, DC, Ottawa, ON, and 
Atlanta, GA, have sizable populations as well. Not surprisingly, these 
overseas residents have tended to coalesce around their clan roots.
121
 
The result has been that diaspora interest in the struggles on the ground 
in Somalia has continued in some cases to the point where the positions 
held by expatriate Somalis has become more intransigent than the 
positions held by those who remained in country. These overseas 
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interests have on occasion used their financial clout to prolong the 
conflict; in other cases, they have sought reconciliation and resolution, 
as demonstrated in the case of the Chandlers.  
 
Islam in Somalia 
The issue of Muslim identity has not been an important 
political factor in Somalia; to use an oft-repeated phrase, it has been a 
“veil lightly worn.’ Arguably, Islam as experienced in Somalia is quite 
different from Islam elsewhere: Somalia was converted originally by 
Sufi sects, which interpret Islam tolerantly, while politics and religion 
have never been unified as they have in most other parts of the Muslim 
world.
122
 In the political realm, Islam has only served as a rallying cry 
in response to foreign interference, whether British and Italian 
colonialism or American and Ethiopian military intervention. Sufi 
political quietism has been strained by the recent rise of activist 
Islamism, however.
123
 While for the most part this has grown only 
shallow roots in Somalia itself, it appears to have taken a stronger hold 
among expatriate Somali communities in Kenya, Europe, and North 
America, and among the ethnically Somali Ogadeni in Ethiopia.  
During the Barre era, secular and public education was 
neglected, and Islamic schools went some way toward filling this 
educational vacuum. Funded by Saudi and Gulf sources, they tended to 
espouse Salafism, the belief that every Islamic state must be based on 
the earliest and “purest’ form of Islam. The present generation that is 
in, or is vying for, power has been influenced by these teachings, in 
some cases profoundly. For these Somalis, Salafism’s appeal lies in its 
strong opposition to international trends and its rejection of existing 
social structures, such as clannism, that in their view exacerbates 
internal divisions and facilitates external interference in Somali 
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 Because Salafists held the strongest rejectionist views, they 
attracted others who may not have fully understood or shared its 
ideology. Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI), the group that has spawned the 
current crop of violent jihadist groups operating in Somalia, was 
formed during the 1980s, reached the peak of its influence in 1992 
shortly after Barre fell and, by around 2005, had virtually ceased to 
exist. Nonetheless, even if AIAI was weakened organizationally, 
politically motivated Islam was on the upswing. While its adherents’ 
beliefs, aims, and methods were generally unpopular, they gained a 
reputation for delivering what they promised, honestly and efficiently. 
The key to their success lay not in the power of their ideas or the 
quality of their organization, but in the consistent and substantial 
financial support they received from wealthy patrons and Islamic 
charities outside the country. The prolonged governmental collapse and 
the tearing down of traditional social institutions, first by Barre and 
then during the course of the civil war, left Somalia exposed to the 
influence of Islamist groups that were no more interested in the well-
being of its inhabitants than any other external player. 
 
Islamic Militant Groups 
When the ICU fell in January 2007, it was succeeded by al-
Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, two militant Islamist groupings that drew 
the bulk of their support from the southern part of Somalia. They were 
opposed by Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, a clan-based, “moderate” Islamist 
or Sufi-oriented grouping originating north of Mogadishu.  
The largest and most militant of the Islamist groups was the 
Salafist al-Shabaab (“youth” in Arabic). Although it only emerged 
publically in 2003, it claims to have been founded in 1998. It has often 
been portrayed as the ICU’s militia, but was more akin to a separate 
faction that grew in strength and influence through the use of violence. 
It carried out killings and attempted killings in Somaliland in 2003 and 
2004 and murdered a BBC journalist in 2005. 
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Although it played a leading role against the Ethiopian army in 
December 2006, its fighters stayed behind to join the clan-based 
resistance when the ICU was routed and its leaders driven into exile in 
January 2007. Initially their contribution was marginal. Resistance 
leaders wanted to keep it that way. Al-Shabaab, however, was able to 
call on Islamist sympathizers overseas (and possibly in Eritrea
125
) to 
provide it with resources sufficient to make it the most effective armed 
opposition to the Ethiopian military presence. Ethiopia’s departure in 
January 2009 left al-Shabaab the most powerful armed group in 
southern Somalia and one consistently opposed to the internationally 
recognized TFG, which it confined to a small part of Mogadishu.  
Al-Shabaab is not a monolithic entity – like so much in 
Somalia, it is an uneasy coalition of interests—and its hard-line, 
Wahabist-inspired social policies and punishments, including stoning 
and amputation, have earned it fear but few friends.
126
 Although it is 
described regularly as being associated with al-Qaeda and publically 
announced its allegiance to Osama bin Laden in September 2009, how 
deep that allegiance goes and how much it is driven by one faction 
rather than the leadership as a whole remains open to doubt.  
Its links to piracy have also been widely touted. Establishing 
that ransom money helps fund al-Shabaab operations and may 
ultimately be shared with al-Qaeda would draw increased resources to 
the counter-piracy fight and might provoke the United States in 
particular into prosecuting the problem more aggressively. Proof that 
these suggested links exist remain elusive, although some senior 
regional leaders and officials claim that the allegations are soundly 
based. The difficulty is demonstrating that funds reach al-Shabaab and 
are used to fund operations directly, rather than as a consequence of 
personal or clan connections. Pirate operations are more exposed to 
pressure from al-Shabaab now than previously. Because the pirates are 
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now mostly located outside Puntland, they have been forced into areas 
where they need to co-exist with the Islamists.
127
  
Hizbul Islam (the “Party of God”) was the second Islamist 
armed group operating in the south. It, too, was a coalition, but one 
bound together more loosely than al-Shabaab. Its leading figure was 
Sheik Aweys, an Islamic nationalist whose vision of a Somalia united 
under sharia law lacked the simplicity of al-Shabaab’s vision as well as 
the clan support to give it roots.
128
 Aweys moved twice against pirate 
operations: once as leader of the ICU in 2006 when its forces 
successfully drove the pirates out of Haradheere, and once when Hizbul 
Islam attacked the town in 2010. This raid succeeded in driving the 
pirates north, at least for a while, and unsettled pirate operations as far 
away as Adado, as the Chandlers’ experience attests.
129
 The motive for 
the attack had almost certainly little to do with principled opposition to 
piracy and more to do with the need to gain control of a stretch of the 
coast the group could use as a port or trans-shipment point. Despite the 
presence of persistent conflict, economic life within Somalia has 
continued and in some cases thrived: exports of livestock and charcoal 
have continued, with imports of all that is needed to make life tolerable 
within Somalia coming the other way. Control of ports and the income 
they provide has therefore been important to all political groups since 
Barre’s fall. Hizbul Islam lost its port revenue when it was driven out 
of Kismayo by al-Shabaab, its then partner, during a power struggle in 
October 2009.
130
 The need to replace it prompted the move on 
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 During 2010, reports that al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam 
had merged were interwoven with other reports that they were fighting 
each other.
132
 By December, the consensus appeared to be that a merger 
had taken place. The absorption of Hizbul Islam also has implications 
for al-Shabaab. If Michael Weinstein is correct, it will tip the internal 
balance within al-Shabaab away from the transnational terrorist wing, 
which is the natural ally of al-Qaeda, and toward the more inward-
looking nationalist wing that, like the groups that made up Hizbul 




The clan-based opposition was named Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca 
(ASWJ), led by Sheikh Mahamed Moallem Hussein.
134
 Its first clash 
with al-Shabaab took place even before the Ethiopian army withdrew in 
2009.
135
 The group draws support from the major Hawiye sub-clans in 
the central Hiiraan and Galgudud regions, including the Haber Gedir 
Ayr. Other clans in the region include the Sa’ab and the Sulieman, both 
of which have known connections with piracy. These sub-clans have 
shown some support for ASWJ, but the Sa’ab also have their own 
administration called the Galmudug State of Somali Republic. Adado, 
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the town nearest to where the Chandlers were held, lies in the center of 
this region. ASWJ is affiliated with some non-Hawiye sub-clans as 
well, such as the Marehan in Gedo, who traditionally have been hostile 
to the Hawiye. The group signed a power-sharing deal with the TFG, 
which had revived following the appointment of Sheik Ahmed to the 
presidency in February 2010, but it withdrew from the deal in 





National and International Players 
The Transitional Federal Government was established in 
October 2004. It is recognized by the United Nations and most states as 
the legitimate government of Somalia, even though it controls little 
more than Mogadishu port, airport, and Villa Somalia, the presidential 
palace. It depends on the presence of troops provided by Uganda and 
Burundi, constituted as the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), to survive at all. The mandate provides for a force of 
8,000 troops, but the numbers deployed have rarely exceeded 5,300. 
TFG leaders have been accused of corruption, as have those of 
Puntland, and many Somalis regard it as no more than another faction 
vying for power like the rest. It asserts that if international donors 
would only give it the necessary maritime security resources in terms of 
coastal patrol craft, arms, and training it would be able to tackle piracy. 
This claim, like so much else about it, is utterly illusory. Its current UN 
mandate was due to expire on August 31, 2011, but institutional inertia 
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